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Unfriendly Unilateralism
Monica Hakimi*
This Article examines a category of conduct that I call “unfriendly unilateralism.” One state deprives
another of a benefit (unfriendly) and, in some cases, strays from its own obligations (noncompliant),
outside any structured international process (unilateral). Such conduct troubles many international law-
yers because it looks more like the nastiness of power politics than like the order and stability of law.
Worse, states can abuse the conduct to undercut the law. Nevertheless, international law tolerates un-
friendly unilateralism for enforcement. A victim state may use unfriendly unilateralism against a scofflaw
in order to restore the legal arrangement that existed before the breach. Unfriendly unilateralism is
tolerated here, despite its unsavory attributes, because the formal processes for enforcing international law
are often deficient. Unfriendly unilateralism can compensate for that procedural deficiency and help make
the law effective.
This Article argues that unfriendly unilateralism can play a similarly vital role in lawmaking. The
Article makes both a positive and a normative claim. The positive claim is that, in practice, states use
unfriendly unilateralism not only to enforce but also to help generate law. Unfriendly unilateralism
variously helps create new norms, prevent the erosion of existing norms, reconcile competing objectives, and
strengthen or recalibrate regimes. Unfriendly unilateralism sometimes performs these functions even when
the conduct itself is unlawful—that is, when the conduct is noncompliant and unexcused for enforcement.
The Article’s normative claim is that such unchecked and even unlawful exercises of state power can be
good for international law. Lawmaking allows the legal order to stay relevant and adapt to change.
However, the formal processes for making international law, like those for enforcing it, can be deficient.
Unfriendly unilateralism can compensate for that procedural deficiency and help instigate or support
collective decisions.
Introduction
  For several years now, states have been targeting Iran with various un-
friendly acts: an oil embargo,1 frozen assets,2 travel bans,3 and trade4 and
financial5 restrictions. Some of these acts have been mandated or authorized
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tional Law, and the Florida State University Faculty Workshop for comments on earlier drafts. I am also
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1. See Annie Lowrey & David E. Sanger, U.S. Bets on Changing Iran’s Tune with New Sanctions Aimed at
Lifeblood, N.Y. Times, June 30, 2012, at A6.
2. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1737, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1737].
3. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1803, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008). [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1803].
4. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 2, ¶¶ 3–4, 6.
5. See, e.g., Mark Landler, United States and Its Allies Expand Sanctions Against Iran, N.Y. Times, Nov.
21, 2011, at A6; Mark Landler, Clinton Urges Gulf States to Maintain Iran Sanctions, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10,
2011, at A4.
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by the U.N. Security Council.6 Others have not; they have instead been
taken unilaterally.7 Of these unfriendly and unilateral acts—what I call “un-
friendly unilateralism”—a handful have not complied with the acting states’
substantive obligations.8 What should we make of this conduct?
Most international lawyers conceive of unfriendly unilateralism as an en-
forcement tool. The International Atomic Energy Association (“IAEA”) de-
termined in 2003 that Iran had violated the Nonproliferation Treaty by
failing to report some nuclear activity.9 In 2006, the IAEA referred Iran’s
case to the U.N. Security Council.10 The Council then directed Iran to coop-
erate with the IAEA and stop enriching uranium.11 Between 2006 and
2010, the Council imposed increasingly stringent sanctions on Iran for its
continued noncooperation and enrichment.12 By most accounts, then, the
unfriendly unilateralism has been part of a broader effort to enforce Iran’s
nonproliferation obligations.13
6. See S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 2, ¶¶ 3–4, 6, 7, 12 (trade restrictions and asset freezes); S.C. Res.
1747, ¶¶ 4–5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1797] (asset freezes and
arms restrictions); S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 3, ¶¶ 5, 7–8 (travel bans, trade restrictions, and asset
freezes); S.C. Res. 1929, ¶¶ 8, 10–13, 18–19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010) [hereinafter S.C.
Res. 1929] (travel bans, trade restrictions, asset freezes, and arms restrictions).
7. See, e.g., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-08-58, Iran Sanctions: Impact is Unclear
and Should be Evaluated (2007) (reviewing U.S. actions); Helene Cooper & Steven R. Weisman,
West Tries a New Tack to Block Iran’s Nuclear Agenda, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 2007, at A3 (reporting on
unilateral financial restrictions).
8. Compare, e.g., S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 2, ¶ 12, Annex (requiring states to freeze assets of particu-
lar persons or entities), with Council Common Position (EC) No. 2007/140/CFSP of 27 Feb. 2007, art. 3,
2007 O.J. (L 61) 49 (freezing additional assets), and Martin Dawidowicz, Public Law Enforcement Without
Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of State Practice on Third-Party Countermeasures and Their Relationship to
the UN Security Council, 77 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 333, 351 (2007) (“[T]he freezing of foreign State assets
constitutes a prima facie illegal measure requiring justification under general international law.”).
9. See Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General, ¶ 47, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/75 (Nov. 10, 2003); IAEA,
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Bd. of Governors Res., pmbl.,
¶ f, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/81 (Nov. 26, 2003); Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
art. III(1), opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
10. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Bd. of Gover-
nors Res., IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14 (Feb. 4, 2006).
11. S.C. Res. 1696, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 2, ¶¶
1–2.
12. See S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 2, ¶¶ 3–4, 6, 7, 12 (trade restrictions and asset freezes); S.C. Res.
1747, supra note 6, ¶¶ 4–5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007) (asset freezes and arms restrictions);
S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 3, ¶¶ 5, 7–8 (travel bans, trade restrictions, and asset freezes); S.C. Res. 1929,
supra note 6, ¶¶ 8, 10–13, 18–19, (travel bans, trade restrictions, asset freezes, and arms restrictions).
13. See, e.g., Christian DeFrancia, Enforcing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: The Legality of Preventive
Measures, 45 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 705, 745 (2012); Coralie Pison Hindawi, The Controversial Impact of
WMD Coercive Arms Control on International Peace and Security: Lessons from the Iraqi and Iranian Cases, 16 J.
Conflict & Security L. 417, 421 (2012) (resisting “the use of additional coercive measures . . . to
enforce the obligations created under a treaty regime”); Orde F. Kittrie, Averting Catastrophe: Why the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is Losing its Deterrence Capacity and How to Restore It, 28 Mich. J. Int’l L.
337, 345 (2007) (focusing on the “choices made by those states in a position to enforce the norms”);
Tanya Ogilvie-White, International Responses to Iranian Nuclear Defiance: The Non-Aligned Movement and the
Issue of Non-Compliance, 18 Eur. J. Int’l L. 453, 457 (2007) (“The key question is whether . . . [states
agree] that NPT nonproliferation obligations should be more rigorously upheld and cheats punished.”).
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Conceiving of unfriendly unilateralism as enforcement has deep roots in
the legal literature and now drives the black letter doctrine on state respon-
sibility.14 The doctrine regulates unfriendly unilateralism differently, de-
pending on whether the unfriendly act complies with existing law. But in
any event, a state that suffers from another state’s breach may use unfriendly
unilateralism against that other state in order to restore the pre-breach ar-
rangement. Unfriendly unilateralism is tolerated here, despite its potential
to undercut the other state’s sovereign prerogatives or the rule of law more
generally, because the formal processes for enforcing international law are
often weak or absent. Unfriendly unilateralism can compensate for that pro-
cedural deficiency and help make the law effective.
This Article argues that unfriendly unilateralism can play a similarly vital
role in lawmaking. The Article advances both a positive and a normative
claim. The positive claim is that, in practice, states use unfriendly unilater-
alism not only to enforce but also to help generate law. Unfriendly unilater-
alism variously helps develop new norms, prevent existing norms from
eroding, reconcile competing objectives, and strengthen or recalibrate re-
gimes.15 Unfriendly unilateralism sometimes performs these lawmaking
functions even when the conduct itself is unlawful—that is, when the con-
duct is noncompliant and unexcused for enforcement.16 The Article’s norma-
tive claim is that such unchecked and even unlawful exercises of state power
can be good for international law. Because the lawmaking process is always
ongoing, inaction can be quite destructive for the legal order. It can prevent
positive legal developments or cause the law to erode or become idle. Un-
friendly unilateralism can help overcome inaction and instigate or reinforce
collective decisions.
To be sure, lawmaking might occur through formal channels or without
unfriendly unilateralism. But it also might not. Formal processes for making
international law, like those for enforcing it, lag behind its substantive am-
bitions.17 Substantively, international law touches almost every aspect of
14. The doctrine on state responsibility establishes default norms that almost always govern. See U.N.
Int’l Law Comm’n, The Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Com-
mentaries, pt. 4, art. 55 and accompanying commentary, in Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr.
23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, at 140–41, U.N. Doc. A/56/20;  GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10
(2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles]. However, a handful of regimes further circumscribe the right to use
unfriendly unilateralism. See, e.g., infra note 32 and accompanying text (trade law); Case 232/78, Comm’n
v. France, 1979 E.C.R. 2729 (European Union law).
15. Regimes are “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Stephen D. Kras-
ner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in International Regimes
1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); see also Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Power and
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 19 (1977) (defining regimes as “networks of
rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects”).
16. See, e.g., infra notes 119–22, 138–47, 156–64, 192–97, and accompanying text (discussing cases
in which the unfriendly unilateralism is unlawful).
17. This point is evident in multiple strands of scholarship. First, the literature on lawmaking recog-
nizes that consent-based processes sometimes underperform. See, e.g., Juttaa Brunnée & Stephen J.
Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account 215
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public governance and faces demands to do more. Some of its most pressing
challenges—on issues like nuclear nonproliferation, environmental protec-
tion, and human rights and security—require regulating states that are un-
interested in being regulated or participating meaningfully in international
governance. However, the formal processes for making international law
generally require state consent or participation.18 Intransigent states can eas-
ily obstruct these processes to frustrate the law’s substantive agenda.19 Un-
friendly unilateralism is a potential solution because it can stimulate or
compensate for the legal system’s deficient processes.20
Conceiving of unfriendly unilateralism as lawmaking reveals, for example,
that the recent measures against Iran have largely not been about enforce-
ment. After all, the evidence that Iran’s nuclear program violates its sub-
stantive obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty is inconclusive.21
(2010); Andrew T. Guzman, Against Consent, 52 Va. J. Int’l L. 747 (2012); Laurence R. Helfer, Noncon-
sensual International Lawmaking, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 71, 105. Second, the literature on fragmentation
addresses the challenges to developing coherent norms, where multiple regimes intersect. See generally
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug.11, 2006,  ¶ 143, U.N. Doc. A/
61/10; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006) (discussing “the emergence of specialized and (relatively)
autonomous rules or rule-complexes, legal institutions and spheres of practice”); Filippo Fontanelli et al.,
Introduction, in Shaping Rule of Law through Dialogue: International and Supranational
Experiences 21, 23 (Filippo Fontanelli et al., eds., 2010) (discussing “the absence of constitutional
devices governing the connections between the various legal regimes”). Third, the literature on “global
public goods” highlights that international law’s formal processes are structurally biased against over-
coming collective action problems. See William D. Nordhaus, Some Foundational and Transformative Grand
Challenges for Social and Behavioral Sciences: The Problem of Global Public Goods 2 (Oct. 3, 2010), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1889357.
18. See, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fra. v. Tur.), 1927 P.C.I.J. 10 (Sept. 7) (“The rules of law binding on states
. . . emanate from their own free will . . . . ”); Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law 4
(2005) (“[International law] is based on the consent (express or implied) of states.”). But cf. Helfer, supra
note 17 (discussing exceptions to the general rule).
19. Cf. Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy 193 (2d ed. 1979)
(“[M]atters that cry for remedy remain unregulated, or inadequately regulated, because, in a system that
essentially can legislate only unanimously and with the consent of the regulated, there are conflicts in
values, in judgment, or in perceived national interests.”).
20. See infra Section III.B; cf. Guzman, supra note 17 (arguing for nonconsensual lawmaking to over-
come intransigence and status quo bias); Gregory Shaffer & Daniel Bodansky, Transnationalism, Unilater-
alism and International Law, 1 Transnat’l Envtl. L. 31, 38 (2012) (defending unilateralism more
generally on the ground that “ relying on formal treaty negotiations may be too little too late to prevent
dangerous climate change”). But cf. Nico Krisch, More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US
Predominance in International Law, in United States Hegemony and the Foundations of Interna-
tional Law 135, 174 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003) (“[T]he mere fact that some goals that
appear desirable under a substantive conception of justice might be achieved faster and more easily
within a hegemonic order does not justify the existence of such an order instead of a multilateral system
based on equality.”)
21. See Open Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States Before the S.
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 112th Cong. 5 (2012) (statement of James R. Clapper, Director of Nat’l
Intelligence) (reporting that “Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually
produce nuclear weapons” but that the U.S. intelligence community still does not know if Iran will
“eventually decide to build nuclear weapons”); IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 9, IAEA Doc. GOV/2012/
23 (May 25, 2012)  (discussing “concerns about the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme”) (emphasis added). To be clear, the Nonproliferation Treaty prohibits non-nuclear states from
manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons but not from enriching uranium. NPT, supra note 9, art. II.
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Rather, states have been using unfriendly unilateralism to support a broad
and coordinated lawmaking effort. The goal has been to pressure Iran into
accepting stricter substantive standards and more rigorous oversight.22 As-
sessing the unfriendly unilateralism as enforcement—and especially apply-
ing the doctrine on state responsibility to ask whether any state may use
unfriendly unilateralism to restore the pre-breach arrangement23—misses
the point. This Article’s lawmaking account better captures what states have
been up to.
This account also crystallizes the normative inquiry: should Iran’s non-
proliferation obligations be strengthened entirely through formal channels
or without unfriendly unilateralism? The structured processes at the IAEA
and Security Council are fairly mature, relative to those that operate in other
areas of international law. Yet even these processes might be insufficient, on
their own, to achieve the prescriptive agenda. Indeed, years after states be-
gan using unfriendly unilateralism—that is, acting outside the IAEA and
Council to increase the pressure on Iran—the Council finally encouraged this
unfriendliness. In June 2010, the Council authorized a broad range of un-
friendly conduct that had previously been unilateral and at times noncomp-
liant.24 The conduct seems to have been useful, at least in the eyes of the
Council.25
The treaty’s prohibition on weapons is sometimes interpreted expansively, to include even acquiring the
relevant knowledge, but this interpretation is contested and has not been applied in other cases. See
Daniel H. Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion 16–18 (2009).
22. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 2, pmbl., ¶ 21 (encouraging efforts to negotiate “a long-term
comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with
Iran”); S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 6, Annex II (“We propose a fresh start in the negotiation of a compre-
hensive agreement with Iran.”).
23. Compare, e.g., N. Jansen Calamita, Sanctions, Countermeasures, and the Iranian Nuclear Issue, 42 Vand.
J. Transnat’l L. 1393, 1422–33 (2009) (arguing that state parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty may
unilaterally enforce it), with Pierre-Emmanuel Dupont, Countermeasures and Collective Security: the Case of
the EU Sanctions Against Iran, 17 J. Conflict & Security L. 301, 334-35 (2012) (disagreeing).
24. See S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 6, ¶ 13 (prohibiting trade in or in services relating to “any further
items if the State determines that they could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy
water-related activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems”).
25. The conduct might have been useful for various reasons. First, it increased the pressure on Iran to
accept a more rigorous nonproliferation regime. Second, it might have reinforced the legitimacy of the
decisions by the IAEA and Security Council. This legitimacy arguably was at risk in some circles because
the IAEA and Council have “devot[ed] so much critical attention to Iran . . ., and not to other non-
nuclear states who have for decades engaged in precisely the same production of knowledge and capabili-
ties.” Daniel Joyner, Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Legal Mandate of the IAEA, Jurist—Forum (Nov. 9,
2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/11/dan-joyner-iaea-report.php; cf. Ian Hurd, The Strategic Use of Lib-
eral Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1992–2003, 59 Int’l Org. 495, 523 (2005) (“Once the
dominant powers have come to rely in part on a legitimated institution in the international system, . . .
their influence thereafter relies on a perpetual effort to police and maintain the legitimacy of the institu-
tion.”). Third, the conduct demonstrated that multiple states endorsed the prescriptive effort against Iran
and were willing to overlook any procedural irregularities. For example, the IAEA referral to the Security
Council was irregular in that the IAEA did not first find that Iran had violated a substantive obligation
under the Nonproliferation Treaty. See Statute of the Int’l Atomic Energy Agency, art. XII(C), opened for
signature Oct. 26, 1956, available at http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html; IAEA, Text of the Agreement
Between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
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This Article makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, it
resists the conventional view that unfriendly unilateralism’s principal legal
function is or should be to enforce law. Although others have recognized
that unfriendly unilateralism can play a lawmaking role, no study has sys-
tematically examined its use in lawmaking.26 And none has resisted the en-
forcement perspective as myopic or even counterproductive. Second, this
Article demonstrates that using unfriendly unilateralism in lawmaking can
benefit the international legal order. Unfriendly unilateralism can help keep
international law relevant by instigating or giving effect to collective deci-
sions. Third and perhaps most far-reaching, this Article sheds light on the
perennial question of how international law relates to power politics. Many
international lawyers assume that the exercise of state power—if unchecked
through formal channels and especially if unlawful in substance—is anti-
thetical to the rule of law.27 This Article demonstrates, however, that unilat-
eral and even unlawful exercises of state power can sometimes buttress the
rule of law.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I defines unfriendly unilateralism
and explains why so many international lawyers find it troubling. Part II
demonstrates that, despite its unsavory attributes, unfriendly unilateralism
has long been tolerated for enforcement. Part II then presents an alternative,
lawmaking account of unfriendly unilateralism. It argues that focusing so
heavily on enforcement drowns out and potentially inhibits the use of un-
friendly unilateralism in lawmaking. Part III builds on the lawmaking ac-
count in order to advance the Article’s positive and normative claims:
tion of Nuclear Weapons, art. 19, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/214 (Dec. 13, 1974); Permanent Mission of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Explanatory Note by the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA
on the Director’s General Report on Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Nov. 18, 2011,
attached to IAEA, Communication Dated 8 Dec. 2011 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic
of Iran to the Agency Regarding the Report of the Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards in Iran,
IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/833 (Dec. 12, 2011). In addition, the process was irregular in that the Security
Council imposed obligations on Iran, and the IAEA exercised intrusive oversight authority, without
Iran’s consent or a finding that Iran had violated the Nonproliferation Treaty’s substantive obligations.
See, e.g., supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing new obligation not to enrich uranium); S.C.
Res. 1747, supra note 6, Annex II (“Iran will . . . implement[ ] the Additional Protocol.”); Daniel H.
Joyner, The Security Council as a Legal Hegemon, 43 Geo. J. Int’l L. 225, 241–48 (2012) (describing the
application of oversight arrangements that Iran had not accepted); Daniel Joyner, Iran’s Nuclear Program
and the Legal Mandate of the IAEA, Jurist—Forum (Nov. 9, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/11/dan-
joyner-iaea-report.php (arguing that the IAEA exceeded its mandate by analyzing the possible military
dimensions of Iran’s program).
26. The scholarship that acknowledges any lawmaking role discusses it generically or for a few limited
contexts. See Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, The Limits of International Law 28 (2005) (ac-
knowledging potential role in customary lawmaking); Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S.
Economic Sanctions, 26 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 7 (2001) (describing U.S. actions against Burma as “con-
tribut[ing] importantly to the definition and incorporation of rights into the international system”);
Robert E. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in Aggressive Unilateral-
ism: America’s 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System 113, 116 (Jagdish Bhagwati &
Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990) [hereinafter Aggressive Unilateralism] (describing role of U.S. trade
restrictions in strengthening trade law).
27. See infra notes 230–37 and accompanying text.
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unfriendly unilateralism performs a host of lawmaking functions that help
maintain the international legal order. And tolerating it in lawmaking can
be preferable to the alternative—a legal order that is incapable of making or
giving effect to collective decisions. Part IV addresses some likely objections
to these claims. And Part V discusses the normative, doctrinal, and institu-
tional implications.
I. Unfriendly, Unilateral, Sometimes Noncompliant
To many, unfriendly unilateralism smacks more of the nastiness of power
politics than of the order and stability of law. The conduct is simultaneously
unfriendly, unilateral, and in some cases noncompliant. These attributes all
have deeply negative connotations in the legal literature, though their pre-
cise meanings are unfixed. Each is associated with states exploiting power to
undercut the foundational principle of sovereign equality or the rule of law
more generally. And without question, unfriendly unilateralism can be
abused. This Article argues, however, that it can also be beneficial. To set
the stage for that argument, this Part of the Article defines the above three
attributes and explains when and why each attribute might make state con-
duct problematic. As it turns out, none of the attributes necessarily makes
conduct unlawful or, given the inherent limitations of the international le-
gal order, undesirable.
A state acts unilaterally when it does not channel through a formal inter-
national process the decision to act.28 The legal system’s formal processes are
typically structured so that multiple states consent to or oversee a decision.
These processes both reflect and help preserve the principle of sovereign
equality. With multiple states participating in a decision, the risk of any
one state intruding too heavily on the others’ sovereign prerogatives is lim-
ited.29 That risk is heightened when decisions are made unilaterally because
unilateral decisions are not subject to the structured consent or oversight of
other states.
Yet unilateral decisions are still common in international law. Michael
Reisman has explained that the legality of a unilateral decision depends on
28. See W. Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive Process:
The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 3, 3 (2000) (defining unilateral
actions). “Unilateralism” is sometimes used more loosely than I use it here, to describe conduct that is
overly self-interested or uncooperative. See, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Place and Role of Unilateralism in
Contemporary International Law, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 19, 20 (2000). In much of the literature,
“[u]nilateralism undeniably has a strong pejorative connotation.” Id.; see also Daniel Bodansky, What’s So
Bad about Unilateral Action to Protect the Environment?, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 339, 339 (2000)
(“[U]nilateralism often seems tantamount to a dirty word.”). For qualified defenses of unilateralism, see,
for example, id.; Christine Chinkin, The State That Acts Alone: Bully, Good Samaritan or Iconoclast?, 11
Eur. J. Int’l L. 31 (2000).
29. But cf. Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Out-
comes in the GATT/WTO, 56 Int’l Org. 339 (2002) (demonstrating that power sometimes shapes con-
sent-based processes).
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the extent to which it circumvents a formal alternative.30 Unilateralism is
increasingly suspect as formal processes become more available, effective,
and established as the default for making particular decisions.31 Consider the
enforcement process at the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). This pro-
cess is widely understood to be both effective and exclusive. Thus, a state
that tries to enforce trade law unilaterally, by deviating from its own trade
obligations, acts unlawfully.32 Comparable processes are rare in international
law, so outside of the trade regime, unilateral enforcement is still usually
lawful.33 Moreover, even the WTO process is the default for making only
some decisions to restrict trade. A state may unilaterally deviate from its
trade obligations for reasons other than enforcement, like to protect its do-
mestic market from goods being dumped at less than fair value.34 Unilateral
antidumping does not circumvent a formal alternative because, unlike for
enforcement, states have not established a default and effective international
process for making antidumping decisions.
Adding unfriendliness to unilateralism increases the risk that the conduct
will intrude on another state’s sovereign equality. Unfriendliness deprives a
specific state of some benefit.35 It resembles a stick, as opposed to a carrot.36
Unfriendliness that involves a threat or use of armed force is separately regu-
lated under the U.N. Charter and outside the scope of this Article.37 The
focus here is on non-forcible unfriendliness, like the economic and travel
restrictions against Iran. Unfriendliness exploits a position of power over the
target and so can bully the target into accepting that which it otherwise
would not. Unfriendly unilateralism can also undercut the rule of law. It can
30. Reisman, supra note 28.
31. Id.; cf. Bodansky, supra note 28, at 341 (explaining that a formal process will often be the default
where conduct “directly impacts on another state”).
32. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art. 23, Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401  (Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes), [hereinafter DSU].
33. See infra Section II.A; cf. Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Inter-
state Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. Legal Stud. 303, 304 (2002) (“[W]hen sovereign states enter
into international agreements, they typically do not provide for the mandatory resolution of disputes.”).
34. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade arts.
1, 2.1, 3.1, 3.5, Nov. 16, 1979, Let/1075; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. VI, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
35. Unfriendliness is sometimes used more broadly than I use it here. For example, the U.N. General
Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations closely links unfriend-
liness to the use of force and suggests that the term includes any interference in another state’s affairs, or
any subversion of the principles of sovereign equality or self-determination. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at
123, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
36. The distinction between carrots and sticks depends on the starting point. Carrots improve the
target state’s position relative to the starting point. Sticks worsen that position. Thus, carrots can easily
turn into sticks, as when a state gives and then terminates financial aid. Though both can feel coercive,
carrots are rarely, if ever, treated as problematic. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Noninter-
vention and Nonforcible Influence over Domestic Affairs, 83 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 28–31 (1989).
37. U.N. Charter art. 2(4), ch. VII. The distinction between forcible and nonforcible measures is
legally relevant but still fuzzy at the margins. On the margins, see Gregory F. Treverton, Covert
Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World 136–43 (1987).
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detract from cooperative processes that help build consensus organically and
thus legitimize legal norms.38
Some actors claim that unfriendly unilateralism is inherently coercive and
unlawful, unless it can somehow be excused.39 This claim is typically articu-
lated at such a high level of generality that it captures much conduct that is
common in statecraft and plainly lawful.40 Nevertheless, there appears to be
fairly broad support for limiting unfriendly unilateralism that is extraordi-
narily severe.41 Severe unfriendliness can be quite destructive to the target,
so it should not be entirely within a single state’s discretion.
Finally, unfriendly unilateralism is sometimes noncompliant—that is, in-
consistent with the acting state’s substantive legal obligations. Noncompli-
ance is ordinarily unlawful and undesirable.42 It can disrupt interstate
38. The language of legitimacy is pervasive in the scholarly literature but inconsistently used. As I use
the term, legitimacy depends on how actors perceive a particular norm or act—specifically, whether they
view it as appropriate. These perceptions might be shaped but are not entirely determined by law. On
the general point that collective processes help legitimize norms or conduct, see Inis L. Claude, Jr.,
Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations, 20 Int’l Org. 367, 368–69 (1966).
On the point that unfriendliness “tend[s] to generate resentment and resistance,” “reduc[ing] the likeli-
hood that the [target] will comply without coercion in the future,” see Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority
in International Politics, 53 Int’l Org. 379, 384–85 (1999) [hereinafter Hurd, Legitimacy]. For varied
definitions of legitimacy, see, for example, id. at 381; Claude, supra, at 368–69; Mark C. Suchman,
Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 Acad. of Mgmt. Rev. 571, 574 (1995);
Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 Am. J. Int’l L. 705, 706 (1988).
39. For an overview, see Barry E. Carter, Economic Coercion, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law, www.mpepil.com (last updated Sept. 2009). For a recent pronouncement, see
G.A. Res. 186, U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/186 (Dec. 22, 2011).
40. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 53/141, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/141 (Mar. 8, 1999) (rejecting “unilateral
coercive measures . . . as tools for political or economic pressure against any country”); G.A. Res. 42/173,
¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/173 (Dec. 11, 1987) (condemning “economic measures that have the purpose
of exerting, directly or indirectly, coercion on the sovereign decisions of developing countries”); G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8082, (Oct. 24, 1970) (condemning “measures to coerce another
state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from
it advantages of any kind”); see also U.N. Secretary-General, Economic Measures as a Means of Political and
Economic Coercion against Developing Countries 1, U.N. Doc. A/48/535 (Oct. 25, 1993) (“There is no clear
consensus in international law as to when coercive measures are improper . . . .”); Robert B. Lillich,
Economic Coercion and the “New International Economic Order”: A Second Look at Some First Impressions, in
Economic Coercion and the New International Economic Order 107, 112 (Robert B. Lillich
ed., 1976) (“[T]he prohibitions found in the various U.N. resolutions are pitched on such a high level of
abstraction as to be virtually meaningless.”).
41. See, e.g., supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights,
General Comment 8: The Relationship Between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 17th Sess., Nov. 15–Dec. 5, 1997, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 (Dec. 12, 1997); cf. Draft
Articles, supra note 14, art. 20, cmt. 4 (explaining that one state’s wrongful act will not be excused by
another state’s consent, if that consent is coercively induced); Daniel W. Drezner, Sanctions Sometimes
Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice, 13 Int’l Stud. Rev. 96 (2011) (explaining that concerns
about coercion have led to a shift even in multilateral sanctions, from comprehensive to more targeted
measures).
42. International legal scholars are overwhelmingly disdainful of noncompliance. See, e.g., Philippe
Sands, Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules, at xviii
(2005) (“[T]he rules of international law . . . are necessary and . . . they need to be complied with if
actions are to be treated as legitimate.”); Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the International Rule of
Law, 31 Yale J. Int’l L. 189, 192 (2006) (describing the “assumption—now ubiquitous in interna-
tional law scholarship and political rhetoric—that compliance is sacrosanct and the international rule of
law inviolable”); Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 Am. J. Int’l
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relations, deprive others of their reliance interests, impede shared objectives,
and undercut the credibility of legal commitments.43 However, all legal sys-
tems, including the international one, tolerate or excuse some noncompli-
ance.44 Tolerating or excusing it might be undesirable in absolute terms but
might avoid even greater harms or satisfy greater interests. As I explain in
the next Part, international law sometimes excuses unfriendly unilateralism
that is noncompliant in order to satisfy an enforcement interest. Unfriendly
unilateralism that complies can also satisfy that interest. But as a matter of
positive law, compliant conduct need not be excused.45
To be clear, the positive law classifies unfriendly unilateralism into three
categories. First, unfriendly unilateralism that complies is discretionary.
These acts are termed “retorsions.” Second, acts that do not comply but are
excused for enforcement are called “countermeasures.” The acting state’s
noncompliance is justified by the target’s own noncompliance. Third, un-
friendly unilateralism that does not comply and cannot be excused is unlaw-
ful. I call these acts “disobedient measures” in order to distinguish them
from lawful countermeasures. I elaborate on the law’s three categories of
unfriendly unilateralism below. My point here is that, although the positive
law turns heavily on whether unfriendly unilateralism complies, the con-
cerns with unfriendly unilateralism extend more broadly. Retorsions comply
but are still unilateral and unfriendly. Moreover, because many substantive
L. 607, 620 (2003) (“When a faction tries to use power to subvert the rule of law, the lawyer must
defend it . . . .”); Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, 53 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 537, 548
(2004) (“[C]ompliance with the law . . . is the underlying condition for the legitimacy of [state] ac-
tion.”). An extensive literature now studies when and why states comply with international law, and how
to induce more compliance. This literature is largely explanatory, but much of it reveals a normative
intuition against noncompliance. See, e.g., Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New
Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 109 (1995) (identify-
ing “the elements of a management strategy for improving compliance”); Thomas Franck, The Power
of Legitimacy Among Nations 21, 207 (1990) (discussing the “widely regretted fact that there is not
more obedience” and offering the promise of “constructing—even one day perfecting—a system of rules
and institutions that will exhibit a powerful pull to compliance”); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L.J. 2599, 2646 (1977) (“How do we transform occasional or grudg-
ing compliance with global norms into habitual obedience?”). But see, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Alan O.
Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law: Optimal Remedies, “Legalized Noncompliance,” and Related Issues,
110 Mich. L. Rev. 243, 247 (2011) (“We see no reason why any nation should comply with [interna-
tional law] absent some independent normative argument for compliance.”).
43. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 43 (May
24) (asserting that noncompliance undercuts the “edifice of law”); Franck, supra note 42, at 24 (explain-
ing that noncompliance undercuts habits of compliance); Henkin, supra note 19, at 317 (explaining that
compliance creates “[h]abits of accepting and observing law”). But cf. George W. Downs & Andrea W.
Trento, Conceptual Issues Surrounding the Compliance Gap, in International Law and Organization:
Closing the Compliance Gap 19, 25–26 (Edward C. Luck & Michael W. Doyle eds., 2004) (critiqu-
ing idea that noncompliance undercuts future legal arrangements).
44. For examples in international law, see U.N. Charter art. 103; Draft Articles, supra note 14, arts.
22–25. For examples in U.S. criminal law, see Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic
Analysis, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 199, 213–20 (1982).
45. Draft Articles, supra note 14, at 128; see also Christian J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga
In International Law 8 (2005) (“[T]he distinction is crucial as a matter of law.”). To be clear,
conduct that otherwise complies might become noncompliant by virtue of its severity.
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obligations are imprecise, the question of whether the relevant states com-
plied, and thus of how to classify the unfriendly unilateralism, is often inde-
terminate.46 One goal of this Article, then, is to look beyond the law’s
classification scheme and to examine unfriendly unilateralism more
holistically.
II. Two Perspectives on Unfriendly Unilateralism
International lawyers have long conceived of unfriendly unilateralism as
an enforcement tool.47 They tolerate it, despite its unsavory attributes, be-
cause the legal order’s formal enforcement processes are commonly weak or
absent. Unfriendly unilateralism compensates for that procedural deficiency
and helps make the law effective.48 This enforcement perspective is now
solidified by the doctrine on state responsibility. It marginalizes a second
perspective, which recognizes that unfriendly unilateralism can be a tool not
only for enforcing but also for generating international law.
A. The Dominant Perspective: Enforcement
1. Theoretical Underpinnings
Unfriendly unilateralism enforces international law by pressuring a scoff-
law to comply with the violated obligation or provide adequate reparation.
Further, using unfriendly unilateralism in one case might induce compliance
in future cases.49 Defecting is simply less appealing if it risks an unfriendly
response than if it does not.
Since the eighteenth century, scholars have debated how far this enforce-
ment rationale goes—specifically, when to excuse unfriendly unilateralism
that is noncompliant.50 The literature offers essentially three approaches.
The narrowest approach would permit countermeasures as self-help reme-
46. See, e.g., infra notes 123–26, 164–79 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Evelyn Speyer Colbert, Retaliation in International Law 1–103 (1948) (re-
viewing historical practice); Omer Yousif Elagab, The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Mea-
sures in International Law 6–24 (1988) (same). Naturally, modern compliance theorists also assess
unfriendly unilateralism as an enforcement tool–that is, a way to induce compliance. See, e.g., Chayes &
Chayes, supra note 42, at 88; Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational
Choice Theory 42–49 (2008).
48. Draft Articles, supra note 14, at 128 (explaining that countermeasures “are a feature of a decentral-
ized system in which injured States may seek to vindicate their rights”).
49. See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 Int’l Org. 1, 20 (1986)
(explaining that enforcement can induce compliance by creating a widespread sense of obligation or
desire to maintain satisfying results for the group); Paul B. Stephan, Symmetry and Selectivity: What Hap-
pens in International Law When the World Changes, 10 Chi. J. Int’l L. 91, 95 (2009). For evidence that
unfriendly unilateralism can induce compliance, even when the unfriendly act itself is noncompliant, see
Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 27–54 (1984); Keohane, supra, at 9.
50. For a historical overview, see Georg Nolte, From Dionisio Anzilotti to Roberto Ago: The Classical
International Law of State Responsibility and the Traditional Primacy of a Bilateral Conception of Inter-state
Relations, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1083 (2002).
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dies, available only to states that have themselves been injured by the
breach. For example, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) adopted this
approach in Nicaragua v. United States.51 The court found that, even if Nica-
ragua intervened unlawfully in other Central American states, that conduct
would not have excused the United States’ noncompliance; the United States
would not have been discretely injured by the breach.52 The broadest ap-
proach would permit countermeasures not just as self-help remedies but also
as a form of public enforcement. Third states that have not themselves been
injured might use countermeasures to vindicate a victim state’s rights.53
This broader approach might have excused U.S. countermeasures in
Nicaragua.
The last approach is a compromise. It would permit third states to use
countermeasures in response to especially egregious violations.54 In its mod-
ern variant, this approach focuses not just on the severity of a violation but
also on its kind—in particular, whether the scofflaw violated a so-called erga
omnes obligation. The ICJ has defined erga omnes obligations as those that
are owed to “the international community as a whole” such that “all states
. . . have a legal interest in their protection.”55 The court has never ex-
plained how obligations become erga omnes,56 but it has attached that label
to fundamental obligations on the use of force and human rights.57 If all
states have a legal interest in these obligations, then (the reasoning goes) any
51. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
52. Id. ¶ 249.
53. See, e.g., Cornelius Van Bynkershoek, De Foro Legatorum Liber Singularis ch. XXII, at
554 (Gordon J. Laing trans., 1946) (1744); Ellery C. Stowell, Intervention in International
Law 46–50 (1921).
54. See HUGO Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace  bk. 2. ch. 20 ¶ 40 (Stephen C. Neff ed.,
Francis W. Kelsey trans., 2012) (“[States] have the right of demanding punishments not only on account
of injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account of injures which do not
directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard any persons whatso-
ever.”);. William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law 65 (A. Pearce Higgins ed., 8th
ed. 1924) (“When a State grossly and patently violates international law in a matter of serious impor-
tance, it is competent to any State . . . to hinder the wrongdoing from being accomplished, or to punish
the wrong-doer.”); Elihu Root, The Outlook for International Law, 10 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 9 (1915)
(“[V]iolations of the law of such a character as to threaten the peace and order of the community of
nations must be deemed to be a violation of the right of every civilized nation to have the law maintained
and a legal injury to every nation.”).
55. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶  33 (Feb. 5).
56. There are two dominant theories for identifying erga obligations. One is substantive, focusing on
the “importance of the rights involved.” Id.; see also Tams, supra note 45, at 128–57. The other is
structural, asking whether the obligation runs primarily between pairs of states or between a state and
the broader community. See Claudia Annacker, The Legal Régime of Erga Obligations  in International Law,
46 Austrian J. Pub. Int’l L. 131, 136 (1993–94).
57. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. ¶ 34. Some claim that other obligations also qualify. See, e.g.,
Gabcı́kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶¶ 114–19 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion
of Vice-President Weermantry) (environmental obligations); Tarcisio Gazzini, The Legal Nature of WTO
Obligations and the Consequences of their Violation, 17 Eur. J. Int’l L. 723 (2006) (trade obligations); Huang
Jiefang, Aviation Safety, ICAO and Obligations Erga Omnes, 8 Chinese J. Int’l L. 63 (2009) (obligations
on aviation safety).
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state may use countermeasures for serious or systemic violations. Otherwise,
gross violations that affect core communal interests might go without
redress.58
The broader the justification for countermeasures, the more available they
are for enforcement—but the more they butt up against the above three
concerns. First, concerns about unilateralism. The acting state singlehand-
edly resolves the dispute and secures a remedy, exercising quasi-judicial and
police powers over another sovereign.59 Second, concerns about unfriendli-
ness. Countermeasures might escalate disputes60 or enable strong states to
bully the weak.61 Third, concerns about noncompliance. If countermeasures
are too liberally permitted, states might evade their obligations under the
pretense of prior violations.62 These three concerns run so deep that some
commentators have warned that all but the narrow approach would invite
vigilantism and chaos.63 Most commentators assume that even the narrow
approach carries a serious risk of abuse.64 The enforcement perspective bal-
ances that risk against the interest in enforcing the law.65
58. See, e.g., Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250 Recueil
des Cours 217, 297 (1994); Giorgio Gaja, Obligations Erga Omnes, International Crimes and Jus Cogens: A
Tentative Analysis of Three Related Concepts, in International Crimes of State: A Critical Analysis
of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility 151, 156 (Josehp H. Weiler et al., eds.,
1989). But see, e.g., Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Fourth Report on the Content, Forms and
Degrees of International Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶ 100,  U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/366 (Apr. 14–15,
1983) (by Willem Riphagen) (“[T]he presence of a collective interest . . . should imply a collective
decision-making machinery as regards reprisals . . . .”).
59. See, e.g., 1 Emmerich De Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law
Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns ¶ 348 (James
Brown Scott ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758) (arguing that third-state countermeasures
entail the arbitrary exercise of judicial authority over the sovereign disputants); Elisabeth Zoller,
Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures 59 (1984) (asserting that
using countermeasures to punish would be “the very negation of sovereignty”).
60. See, e.g., Michael Akehurst, Reprisals by Third States, 44 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 1, 15–16 (1970)
(asserting that third-state countermeasures “would certainly cause a very disturbing increase in interna-
tional tension”); James Crawford, Counter-Measures as Interim Measures, 5 Eur. J. Int’l L. 65, 65 (1994)
(asserting that countermeasures “can tend to exacerbate disputes”).
61. Draft Articles, supra note 14, at 128 (explaining that the risk of abuse “is exacerbated by the
factual inequalities between States”); Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Fifth Report on State
Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n,  ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/453 (May 12, 28, June 8, 24, 1993) (by
Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz); Christian Tomuschat, Are Counter-Measures Subject to Prior Recourse to Dispute Set-
tlement Procedures?, 5 Eur. J. Int’l L. 77, 78 (1994) (“[T]ime and again concern was voiced that counter-
measures were essentially an instrument for powerful States to enforce their interests . . . .”).
62. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Controlling Countermeasures, in International Responsibility
Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter 49, 49–53 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., 2005); Yoshiro
Matsui, Countermeasures in the International Legal Order, 37 Japanese Ann. Int’l L. 1, 4–6 (1994).
63. See D.N. Hutchinson, Solidarity and Breaches of Multilateral Treaties, 59 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 151,
202 (1988); Stephen McCaffrey, Lex Lata or the Continuum of State Responsibility, in International
Crimes of State: A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility,
supra note 58, at 244; Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 Am. J. Int’l
L. 413, 433 (1983).
64. See, e.g., Draft Articles, supra note 14, at 128 (adopting the narrow approach but lamenting that
countermeasures are still “liable to abuse”).
65. See, e.g., Jochen A. Frowein, Reactions by Not Directly Affected States to Breaches of Public International
Law, 248 Recueil des Cours 345, 423 (1994) (“[O]ne has to balance . . . the need to protect the
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Part of that balance is also in play when the state that uses unfriendly
unilateralism complies with its substantive obligations. But because retor-
sions need not be excused under the positive law, they receive little atten-
tion in the legal literature. Retorsions are treated as legally relevant to the
extent that they help enforce the law.66
2. Doctrinal Solidification
The enforcement perspective on unfriendly unilateralism drives the doc-
trine on state responsibility, which the International Law Commission
(“ILC”) codified in the 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility.67 These
draft articles are not themselves binding but are widely viewed as reflecting
customary international law. International courts and tribunals apply the
draft articles.68 Textbooks and treatises incorporate them.69 And interna-
tional lawyers use them to appraise concrete cases.70
The draft articles adopt the narrow approach on countermeasures.71 First,
fundamental rules of the system . . .  [against] the danger that powerful States overstep the limits of the
law.”).
66. See, e.g., Lori F. Damrosch et al., International Law: Cases and Materials 532–33 (5th
ed. 2009) (listing retorsions as among the measures “[a] state injured by another state’s violation of an
international obligation is entitled to take . . . against the offending state as a means of inducing that
state’s compliance”); Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice 186 (1991)
(explaining that retorsions “may have a greater impact on the law-violator” than countermeasures) (em-
phasis added); Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 1128 (6th ed. 2008) (defining retorsion as “a
method of retaliation against the injurious legal activities of another state”) (emphasis added); Tams, supra
note 45, at 8 (defining retorsions as “enforcement measures that are always available to all states”); Nigel
White & Ademola Abass, Countermeasures and Sanctions, in International Law 509, 537–38 (Malcolm
D. Evans ed., 2010) (explaining that retorsions are “usually taken in response to unlawful acts” and
“arguably should be viewed as a residual remedy in the case of a State injured by a breach”).
67. See Draft Articles, supra note 14.
68. See, e.g., Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/
05, Award, ¶¶ 125–80 (Nov. 21, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (search
“Archer Daniels”); Corn Prods. Int’l v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01,
Decision on Responsibility, ¶¶ 144–92 (Jan. 15, 2008), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
Index.jsp (search “corn products”) [hereinafter Corn Products].
69. See, e.g., Damrosch et al., supra note 66, at 532–41; W. Michael Reisman et al., Interna-
tional Law in Contemporary Perspective 960–82 (2004); Shaw, supra note 66, at 794–96; White
& Abass, supra note 66, at 534–35.
70. See, e.g., Hjortur B. Sverrisson, Countermeasures, the International Legal System,
and Environmental Violations (2008); Math Noortmann, Countermeasures in Interna-
tional Law: Five Salient Cases (2005).
71. See Draft Articles, supra note 14, at 128, 135. In addition to the substantive constraints on counter-
measures discussed in the text, the draft articles codify certain procedural constraints. See Draft Articles,
supra note 14, art. 52(1) (requiring advance notice, an offer to negotiate, and a request to comply);
Gabcı́kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 84 (Sept. 25) (requiring a request to
comply). These procedural constraints give the target an opportunity to defend or alter its conduct before
being subjected to countermeasures. However, the procedural constraints are entirely within the acting
state’s control and lifted if they might impinge on the acting state’s remedy. See Draft Articles, supra note
14, art. 52(2) (advance notice unnecessary if would operate to detriment of injured state); Air Services
Agreement of Mar. 27, 1946 between the United States of America and France, (U.S./Fr.) 18 R.I.A.A.
417, ¶¶ 91-92 (1978) (explaining that taking countermeasures during negotiations can be lawful, espe-
cially where the countermeasures accelerate the dispute’s resolution and thereby limit the damage from
the initial breach).
2014 / Unfriendly Unilateralism 119
countermeasures are lawful only if they are taken in response to a breach.72 A
state acts noncompliant at its own risk if the law or facts are uncertain.73
Second and consistent with Nicaragua, countermeasures are self-help rem-
edies, available only to states that have suffered a discrete legal injury.74 The
draft articles do not permit third-state countermeasures for erga omnes vio-
lations but recognize that the law is in flux and might be moving in that
direction.75 Since the ILC adopted the draft articles, several scholars have
demonstrated that third states regularly use countermeasures, without reper-
cussion, in order to redress serious erga omnes violations.76 Unlike the draft
articles, then, the practice seems to tolerate a modest exception for third-
state countermeasures in cases of erga omnes violations.
Third, countermeasures must have a remedial aim. They must be de-
signed to restore the status quo that was ruptured by the breach.77 Counter-
measures are impermissible as punishment78 or to create new legal
arrangements.79 And they must be proportional to the injury.80 Dispropor-
tionate measures are an excessive remedy and might reveal a punitive aim.81
72. Draft Articles, supra note 14, at 130 (describing previous violation as “fundamental prerequisite”);
see also Gabcı́kovo-Nagymaros, 1997 I.C.J. ¶ 83 (“[Countermeasures] must be taken in response to a previ-
ous international wrongful act . . . .”); Corn Products, supra note 68, ¶ 185 (“[A] prior violation of
international law is an absolute precondition . . . .”).
73. Draft Articles, supra note 14, at 130.
74. The draft articles define “injured states” as: (1) states that have an individual right to the per-
formance of the obligation, as in a bilateral treaty, (2) states that are specifically affected by the breach, or
(3) all states to which the obligation is owed, if the breach radically alters all of their positions. Draft
Articles, supra note 14, at 117–18. The idea that violating an obligation does not legally injure all states
to which the obligation is owed or entitle all of them to a remedy has deep roots in international law. See,
e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT] (identifying states that may suspend or termi-
nate a treaty in response to a material breach); South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.),
Judgment (Second Phase), 1966 I.C.J. 6, ¶¶ 49–51 (July 18) (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.); Special
Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Third Report on State Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶ 98, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/354 (Mar. 12, Mar. 30, May 5, 1982) (by Willem Riphagen) (explaining that most multi-
lateral obligations are “bilateralized” in that they run primarily between pairs of states).
75. Draft Articles, supra note 14, at 139.
76. Elena Katselli Proukaki, The Problem of Enforcement in International Law: Coun-
termeasures, the Non-Injured State and the Idea of International Community 206 (2011)
(reviewing practice and concluding that “in many of the cases where states resorted to countermeasures
. . . the issue of legitimacy under international law was never raised”); see also Tams, supra note 45, at
208–51 (same); Dawidowicz, supra note 8, at 350–417 (same).
77. Draft Articles, supra note 14, art. 49; see also Gabcı́kovo-Nagymaros, 1997 I.C.J. ¶ 87 (“[The] pur-
pose must be to induce the wrongdoing State to comply with its obligations under international
law. . . .”).
78. Draft Articles, supra note 14, at 130 (“Countermeasures are not intended as a form of punishment
. . . .”).
79. Id. at 130– 31 (“Their aim is the restoration of a condition of legality . . . , and not the creation of
new situations . . . .”); cf. Gabcı́kovo-Nagymaros, 1997 I.C.J. ¶ 87 (“[T]he measure must be reversible.”).
80. Draft Articles, supra note 14, art. 51; see also, e.g., Responsibility of Germany for Damage Caused in
the Portuguese Colonies in the South of Africa (Naulilaa Case) (Port. v. Ger.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1011, 1026–28
(1928) (holding that destruction of Portuguese installations in Angola was a disproportionate response to
a border skirmish).
81. Draft Articles, supra note 14, at 135.
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• by injured state (or for
erga omnes violation); and






The doctrine’s apparent purpose is to identify when unfriendly unilateral-
ism is lawful. But note that the doctrine cannot provide a concrete answer
when the substantive obligations themselves are imprecise. Consider an ex-
ample. In 1995, Norway closed its ports to an Icelandic ship as retaliation
for Iceland’s increased fishing in the Barents Sea Loophole, a region in the
high seas with fish that straddled Norway’s exclusive economic zone. The
Surveillance Authority of the European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”)
found that, by closing its ports, Norway had strayed from its EFTA obliga-
tions.82 Nevertheless, the authority declined to hold Norway responsible.83
The authority was unsure whether Iceland had violated a vague duty to co-
operate on maritime conservation under the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention
(“UNCLOS”).84 States were at the time specifying that UNCLOS duty in a
82. See Eur. Free Trade Ass’n (EFTA) Surveillance Auth., Letter of Formal Notice to the Norwegian
Mission to the E.U. on the Failure to Comply with Art. 36 of the EEA Agreement, ¶ 52, EFTA Doc.
No. 96-4652-D (Sept. 3, 1996) (“Norway breached its obligations under Article 36 of the EEA Agree-
ment . . . .”); Agreement on the European Economic Area, art. 36, Mar. 17, 1993, 1994 O.J. (L 1) 3
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) (“[T]here shall be no restrictions on freedom to provide services within
the territory of the Contracting Parties . . . .”).
83. EFTA Surveillance Auth., Letter to Ambassador Einar Bull, Norwegian Mission to the European
Union, at 3, EFTA Doc. No. 98-3393-D (May 14, 1998) [hereinafter Final EFTA Decision] (“[T]he
underlying dispute is one between Norway and Iceland relating to Icelandic fishing in international
waters . . . for which the Authority has no competence.”).
84. Id. at 2 (“[I]t is disputable whether Iceland . . . did breach international law. . . .”); United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 117–19, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS]; see also Moritaka Hayashi,
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing: Global and Regional Responses, in Bringing New Law
to Ocean Waters 95, 96 (David D. Caron & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 2004) (on duty’s vagueness).
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supplemental agreement on straddling fish stocks, but this supplemental
agreement had not yet entered into force.85 If Iceland violated UNCLOS,
Norway’s conduct might well have been lawful. Otherwise, Norway acted
disobediently. The doctrine on state responsibility cannot resolve the ques-
tion. What the doctrine does is frame the legal analysis and focus lawyers on
a discrete set of enforcement-related questions.
B. The Muted Perspective: Lawmaking
Focusing so heavily on enforcement marginalizes the role that unfriendly
unilateralism plays in lawmaking. The lawmaking literature recognizes that
states are not just recipients of international law, obligated to comply with
its terms. They also actively create law. And they create law in part through
their unilateral and even disobedient actions.86 However, the lawmaking
perspective receives almost no attention when states couple unilateralism
with unfriendliness. Unfriendly unilateralism is almost always assessed in
enforcement terms and without accounting for its lawmaking potential.
Moreover, as Part III of the Article explains, to recognize that unfriendly
unilateralism has lawmaking potential is only to begin to appreciate the
work that it does in the international legal order.
1. Theoretical Underpinnings
Unilateralism’s role in lawmaking is most evident in the literature on
custom. Customary international law develops from an interactive process in
which different actors make and respond to one another’s legal claims.87
These actors might persistently advance conflicting claims, in which case
the law remains unsettled, or they might converge around the same claim
and create custom. The process is continuous.88 Even after a customary norm
emerges, its content or efficacy fluctuates as relevant actors engage with the
85. See Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 Dec. 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Dec. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement] (“The objective of this Agreement
is to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of . . . fish stocks through effective implemen-
tation of [UNCLOS].”).
86. See Anthony D.A. D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law 97–98
(1971) (explaining that every breach of a customary norm is the seed for a new norm); Arthur A. Weis-
burd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1, 30–31 (1988)
(same).
87. See Karol Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law 56–58 (2d ed. 1993); Myres S.
McDougal, Editorial Comment, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 Am. J.
Int’l L. 356, 357 (1955) (describing “a process of continuous interaction . . .  in which the decision-
makers . . . unilaterally put forward claims . . . and in which other decision-makers weigh and appraise
these competing claims . . . and ultimately accept or reject them”).
88. See W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 Am. Soc’y Int’l
L. Proc. 101, 108, 113 (1981) [hereinafter Reisman, Lawmaking]; Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional
and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 757, 784 (2001)
(“Customs can generally change and harden over time because custom is a fluid source of law.”).
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norm over time. Thus, repeated defections that go unaddressed demonstrate
that a norm has changed or eroded—or at least that global actors are not
sufficiently committed to making it effective.89 Such cycles can beget more
defections and eventually push norms into desuetude.90 By contrast, re-
sponding to defections with strong and widespread condemnation can have
the opposite effect. It can help strengthen a theretofore tenuous norm.
Although that process is most commonly associated with custom, it de-
scribes international lawmaking more generally.91 As some of the literature
on “soft law” explains, legally relevant norms can be soft along three dimen-
sions: in content, authority, or effect.92 What often gets overlooked is that,
because the lawmaking process is continuous, softness along any dimension
can fluctuate over time. Any interaction that puts a particular norm at issue
communicates not only whether states have complied but also, and more
critically, what the norm requires going forward and to what extent it re-
flects an operative legal commitment.93
The point is worth spinning out. A norm is soft in content if it is impre-
cise. In the Norway-Iceland dispute, the UNCLOS duty to cooperate was
soft in content. Over time, that treaty norm could, like a customary norm,
remain ambiguous or develop a shared meaning. A norm is soft in authority
when it has not been produced by a formal lawmaking process and is not
clearly binding.94 Such norms might still be law-like if they are given some
89. See Shaw, supra note 66, at 89 (“Generally, where states are seen to acquiesce in the behaviour of
other states without protesting against them, the assumption must be that such behaviour is accepted as
legitimate.”); Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 Geo. L.J. 939, 951–63 (2005) (argu-
ing that valid international legal rules are infrequently violated).
90. See Franck, supra note 42, at 24 (explaining that noncompliance undermines a norm’s “compli-
ance pull,” making it less likely that others will comply); Glennon, supra note 89, at 960 (“[A]t some
point state practice that is inconsistent with a norm is simply too thick to justify the conclusion that
states really accept the norm as obligatory . . . . At this point the rule has fallen into desuetude.”); Root,
supra note 54, at 9 (“International laws violated with impunity must soon cease to exist . . . .”).
91. Cf. VCLT, supra note 74, art. 31(3)(b) (providing for treaty interpretations to reflect “[a]ny subse-
quent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation”).
92. Many scholars focus on only one of these dimensions. For scholars who identify all three, see
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 Int’l Org. 421,
421 (2000); Michael Reisman, The Concept and Functions of Soft Law in International Politics, in 1 Essays in
Honour of Judge Taslim Olawale Elias 135, 136 (Emmanuel G. Bello & Bola A. Ajibola eds.,
1992) [hereinafter Reisman, Soft Law]. The phrase “soft law” is controversial. See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, The
Redundancy of Soft Law, 65 Nordic J. Int’l L. 167, 168 (1996). But for the reasons described in the text,
the phrase remains conceptually useful.
93. John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International In-
stitutionalization 98 (1998) (“Precisely because state behavior within regimes is interpreted by
other states, . . . [state interactions] are absolutely critical component parts of any explanation involving
the efficacy of [regime] norms.”); W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre
in the Study of International Law, 10 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 4–5 (1984) (encouraging analysts to appraise
events as norm-indicators).
94. See, e.g., Wolfgang Reinicke & Jan Martin Witte, Interdependence, Globalization, and Sovereignty: The
Role of Non-Binding International Legal Accords, in Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-
Binding Norms in the International Legal System 75, 76 n.3 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (“‘[S]oft’
law as used herein means normative agreements that are not legally binding.”).
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legal effect. For example, Norway and the EFTA Surveillance Authority
both treated the straddling fish stocks agreement as legally relevant, even
though the agreement was not yet binding.95 The agreement became author-
itatively harder when it finally entered into force, but it could have hard-
ened along this dimension even if it had never entered into force. It still
could have reflected states’ expectations on the UNCLOS duty.96 Indeed, the
Draft Articles on State Responsibility are not themselves codified in any
binding text. They become authoritatively harder as relevant actors repeat-
edly invoke and apply them as law.97 Finally, norms are soft in effect when
actors have not committed sufficient resources for implementation or en-
forcement.98 Some human rights norms are authoritatively hard—that is,
codified in binding texts—but effectively soft. A state can unilaterally
harden these norms simply by doing more on implementation or by subject-
ing its conduct to third-party review.99
Because lawmaking occurs in a broad range of settings, the role of uni-
lateralism varies.100 Unilateralism might not play any role or might be hard
to identify in highly structured settings, like those of international organiza-
tions.101 Rather, unilateralism tends to be more overt in decentralized are-
nas. One well-known example is the law on the continental shelf. This law
emerged through a series of independent and unilateral claims, beginning
with the 1945 U.S. Truman Proclamation.102 Other states soon advanced
95. Norwegian Mission to the E.U., Letter to EFTA Surveillance Authority, ¶ 45–50, EFTA Doc.
No. 96-7009A (Nov. 29, 1996); Final EFTA Decision, supra note 83, at 2–3.
96. See Alan Boyle & Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law 215, 220
(2007) (contesting the “assumption that [treaties] are necessarily more authoritative” than non-binding
instruments and explaining that, “even when not incorporated directly into a treaty, [a non-binding
instrument] may represent an agreed understanding of the terms of the treaty”); cf. Henkin, supra note
19, at 218 (explaining that, as political interests in an exclusive economic zone shifted, it became “a
foregone conclusion” that the zone either would be written into a future convention or “would emerge as
the law in fact” without a convention).
97. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., David Trubek et al., ‘Soft Law,’ ‘Hard Law’ and EU Integration, in Law and New Gov-
ernance in the EU and the US 65, 67 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006). Some literature
assesses whether a norm is hard in effect by whether the norm’s interpretation or application has been
delegated to a centralized body. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 92, at 421. However, decentralized actors
can also make norms effective.
99. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (establishing an optional,
third-party review process).
100. See Boyle & Chinkin, supra note 96, at 2 (“Law-making processes take place in many arenas
. . . .”).
101. See generally José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers 184–268
(2006).
102. Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of
the Continental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305 (Sept. 28, 1945). The “continental
shelf” is the seabed and subsoil in the area adjacent to a state’s territorial sea, to a certain depth below sea
level. See UNCLOS, supra note 84, art. 76; Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. On the development of this regime, see Zdenek J. Slouka, Inter-
national Custom and the Continental Shelf: A Study in the Dynamics of Customary Rules
of International Law 32 (1968).
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similar claims, leading to a treaty in 1958103 and eventually the ICJ’s decla-
ration that the treaty reflected “received or at least emergent rules of cus-
tomary international law.”104 U.S. unilateralism catalyzed that decentralized
process for making international law.
Unilateralism is often only discursive and not accompanied by any un-
friendly act.105 But states sometimes use unfriendliness to reinforce their
unilateral claims.106 Take another example from the law of the sea. In the
late 1940s and early 1950s, coastal states began unilaterally claiming the
exclusive right to fish in designated areas beyond their coasts.107 Iceland was
especially assertive. Between 1958 and 1975, it claimed an increasingly ex-
pansive fishing zone and harassed U.K. ships that entered the zone.108 After
the ICJ found that the United Kingdom could lawfully fish beyond twelve
miles of Iceland’s coast,109 Iceland claimed for itself a 200-mile zone.110 Ice-
land’s conduct against the United Kingdom—which was unfriendly, unilat-
eral, and at times disobedient—was part of a broader effort to change the
law. It helped prompt the negotiation of UNCLOS, which finally stabilized
the exclusive economic zone at 200 miles.111
2. Doctrinal Marginalization
Unfriendly unilateralism’s potential in lawmaking is completely
marginalized by the doctrine on state responsibility. The doctrine is con-
cerned only with an enforcement-related inquiry: did the disputing states
comply with the law that existed at the time of their dispute? That focus
obscures unfriendly unilateralism’s lawmaking role because lawmaking is an
extended process. It depends not just on the disputing states’ first moves but
103. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 102.
104. North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Republic of Ger./Den.; Fed. Republic of Ger./Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 3, 39 (Feb. 20).
105. See, e.g,, Chayes & Chayes, supra note 42, at 118; Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in Interna-
tional Law and Institutions 7 (1995); Ian Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation: Interna-
tional Law, Politics and Organizations 22–27 (2011); Harold Hongju Koh, Address, The 1998
Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 623, 644–45 (1998).
106. Cf. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement,
148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503, 1568 (2000) (“There are some things we can express only with deeds because
words alone cannot adequately convey our attitudes.”); Hudec, supra note 26, at 138 (“Retaliation is
primarily a symbolic act, a way of making clear the seriousness of the government’s objection . . . .”).
107. See R.R. Churchill & A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea 228 (2d ed. 1988).
108. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 23–29 (July 25) (describing Iceland’s
claims between 1958 and 1972) [hereinafter Fisheries Jurisdiction]; Richard R. Bilder, The Anglo-Ice-
landic Fisheries Dispute, 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 37, 53 (describing Iceland’s conduct against U.K. vessels).
109. Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 108, ¶ 79.
110. See Gary Knight & Hungdah Chiu, The International Law of the Sea 598 (1991) (“In
. . . 1975, Iceland extended her fishing limits from 50 to 200 miles, setting off another round in the
[dispute with the U.K.].”); see also Fisheries Agreement relating to the Extension of the Icelandic Fishery
Limits to 200 Nautical Miles, Belg.-Ice., Nov. 28, 1975, 15 I.L.M. 1 (acknowledging Iceland’s claim);
Fisheries Agreement relating to the Extension of the Icelandic Fishery Limits to 200 Nautical Miles,
Ger.-Ice., Nov. 28, 1975, 15 I.L.M. 43 (same).
111. UNCLOS, supra note 84, arts. 55–56.
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also on the broader context in which their dispute erupted and was re-
solved.112 That context is completely off the doctrinal radar screen.
To appreciate the difference, consider again the U.K.-Iceland dispute on
the exclusive economic zone. The doctrinal inquiry ends upon determining
that, to the extent that Iceland acted unlawfully, U.K. countermeasures
would have been lawful. The lawmaking perspective continues the analysis.
It asks, for example, about the viability of the United Kingdom’s legal posi-
tion, given the competing claims on the law. In the event, Iceland acted as
part of an energetic movement, motivated mostly by newly decolonized
states, to shift the law.113 No matter whether U.K. countermeasures would
have been lawful at a specific moment, preserving the U.K. legal position
would have required an intense global campaign—and probably still would
have failed.114 Asking only how the dispute fit within the law as it was
elides the question of what the dispute portended for the law going forward.
The doctrine is similarly myopic for assessing Norway’s unfriendly unilater-
alism against Iceland. Given that Norway’s conduct was noncompliant, the
doctrine asks only whether Norway itself suffered a discrete injury and acted
to restore the status quo ante. That inquiry misses what Norway was up to.
More than reinstating the law as it was, Norway was supporting emerging
expectations on what the law would become.
The doctrine not only obscures unfriendly unilateralism’s role in lawmak-
ing but also affirmatively inhibits states from using unfriendly unilateralism
for that purpose. Only retorsions are permissible for lawmaking. Counter-
measures must restore a preexisting legal arrangement, and disobedient
measures are categorically prohibited. Thus, a state acts noncompliant at its
own risk if, as in the Norway-Iceland dispute, the target defected from a
still nascent norm. Its noncompliance is disobedient if the target acted law-
fully but intransigently or in bad faith. By contrast, the lawmaking perspec-
tive highlights that, in precisely those kinds of cases, unfriendly
unilateralism can play a salutary role. It can catalyze further lawmaking or
solidify a theretofore tenuous norm.
III. Unfriendly Unilateralism in Lawmaking
Assessing state practice from the lawmaking perspective, rather than from
the enforcement one, reveals that unfriendly unilateralism can perform a
whole host of prescriptive functions. It variously helps: (1) preserve substan-
tive norms, (2) reconcile the law’s competing objectives, (3) strengthen re-
112. See Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 20, at 8 (“Unilateral action is not a one-step dance . . . [but
rather] part of a dynamic process of action and reaction.”).
113. See Winston Conrad Extavour, The Exclusive Economic Zone 127–62 (1979) (review-
ing practice).
114. See Henkin, supra note 19, at 212–27 (describing the political forces that made change almost
inevitable).
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gimes by prompting stricter substantive obligations or more rigorous
implementation mechanisms, and (4) recalibrate regimes for changed cir-
cumstances. Further, unfriendly unilateralism can be an especially versatile
and potent lawmaking tool. Most of the literature on lawmaking recognizes
that unilateral action can help make law by modeling a new norm. For ex-
ample, this is what the U.S. Truman Proclamation did for the law on the
continental shelf. Unfriendly unilateralism is unique in that the acting state
usually does not model the new norm. Rather, its unfriendly act can pressure
the target into accepting or helping to develop an entirely different norm.
Unfriendly unilateralism thus can help make law no matter whether the
conduct itself is or remains unlawful.
I take no position on whether using unfriendly unilateralism in any par-
ticular case is desirable. My normative claim is pitched at a higher level of
generality: using unfriendly unilateralism—including disobedient mea-
sures—in lawmaking sometimes benefits the international legal order itself.
Because the lawmaking process is always ongoing, inaction can be worse for
the legal order than is unfriendly, unilateral, and even disobedient action.
Inaction can inhibit positive legal developments or cause the law to erode or
become idle. By contrast, unfriendly unilateralism can catalyze or support
collective decisions. It thus can compensate for shortcomings in the legal
order’s formal lawmaking processes, enabling the law to stay relevant and
adapt to change. As Louis Henkin once said, “[t]he survival and authority of
international law depends on its capacity for necessary change.”115
A. Lawmaking as Maintaining the Legal Order
1. Preserving Substantive Norms
Unfriendly unilateralism plays a lawmaking role even in classic enforce-
ment scenarios; using it against a scofflaw helps preserve the violated norm.
This point appears in some of the enforcement literature: if enforcement
induces compliance, then the violated norm remains operative.116 The point
is worth underscoring, however, for three reasons. First, most of the enforce-
ment literature defines unfriendly unilateralism as self-help.117 This lan-
guage wrongly suggests that unfriendly unilateralism benefits only the
acting state. Yet if the violated norm is multilateral, preserving it carries a
systemic benefit. Second, even disobedient measures can induce compliance
and thus help preserve a violated norm. Third, some scholars dismiss en-
forcement as unnecessary for or ineffective at inducing compliance.118 Un-
115. Id. at 100.
116. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Enforcing International Law Through Non-Forcible Measures, 269 Recueil
des Cours 9, 99 (1997) (explaining that U.S. enforcement “helps to preserve (or as the case may be, to
advance) the core content of the norms”).
117. See, e.g., Draft Articles, supra note 14, at 136.
118. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 42, at 3 (unnecessary); Chayes & Chayes, supra note 42, at 3–9
(unnecessary or ineffective); Akehurst, supra note 60, at 14–15 (same).
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friendly unilateralism can help preserve a norm even if it fails at enforcement
and has no effect on compliance. Using unfriendly unilateralism signals that
the violated norm remains operative and has not fallen into desuetude.
Disobedient measures can induce compliance, just as retorsions and coun-
termeasures can. In other words, an acting state need not suffer a discrete
injury or respond to an erga omnes violation in order for its noncompliance
to help preserve the violated norm. The United Kingdom famously de-
fended this claim after Albania ignored the ICJ’s judgment in Corfu Chan-
nel.119 A tripartite commission comprised of the United Kingdom, France,
and the United States had in its possession and offered to transfer to the
United Kingdom some Albanian gold. The transfer would have been disobe-
dient for France and the United States because those states had not been
discretely injured by Albania’s breach. The United Kingdom nevertheless
defended the transfer with a claim like the one for erga omnes obligations:
because all states have an interest in ICJ judgments being operative, any
state may “do what [it] can to ensure that judgments . . . are carried out.”120
This claim was never addressed by the ICJ121 but has strong support in the
literature on the enforcement of international judgments.122
The claim is equally compelling in other contexts. For instance, in the
late 1980s, the International Whaling Commission (“IWC”) adopted a
moratorium on commercial whaling.123 Under the Whaling Convention, any
state could lawfully disregard the moratorium simply by objecting to it.124
Further, had any state continued commercial whaling, its conduct would not
have discretely injured the United States. Nevertheless, the United States
took or threatened trade restrictions against states that intended to continue
commercial whaling. Some of the trade restrictions might well have been
disobedient. Steve Charnovitz has explained that, although the relevant
trade law was imprecise at the time, authoritative trade bodies likely would
have viewed the U.S. restrictions as unlawful.125 Still, the United States ap-
119. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
120. Oral Argument of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v.
France, U.K. & U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. Pleadings 124, 126 (June 15, 1954).
121. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. France, U.K. & U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19, 34
(June 15) (dismissing on jurisdictional grounds the follow-up case to Corfu Channel).
122. See, e.g., C. Wilfred Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication 690 (1971); 1
Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920–2005, 232–34
(2005); Akehurst, supra note 60, at 15–16; Oscar Schachter, The Enforcement of International Judicial and
Arbitral Decisions, 54 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 6–12 (1960).
123. 2 Patricia Birnie, International Regulation of Whaling: From Conservation of
Whaling to Conservation of Whales and Regulation of Whale-Watching 615 (1985) (re-
printing moratorium).
124. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling art. V(3)(c), Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat.
1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T. 361 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948) (“[Any] amendment . . .
shall not become effective with respect to any Government which has so objected until such date as the
objection is withdrawn.”).
125. Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An Analysis of the Pelly Amendment
on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 Am. u. Int’l L. Rev. 751, 775–807 (1994).
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pears to have induced other states—including those that whaled lawfully—
to abide by the moratorium.126
Yet even when unfriendly unilateralism does not induce states to comply,
it can still help preserve the violated norm. Recall that violations followed
by inaction can contribute to the norm’s erosion.127 When Norway openly
resumed commercial whaling in 1993,128 several states condemned its con-
duct but none took meaningful action.129 In less than a decade, the morato-
rium became more aspirational and less effective. By contrast, responding
with unfriendly unilateralism would have reinforced the moratorium. As the
literature on erga omnes obligations demonstrates, states periodically use
unfriendly unilateralism to respond to serious human rights violations or
uses of aggressive force.130 In these cases, unfriendly unilateralism rarely
remedies a specific violation or deters future violations.131 Consider the un-
friendly measures that Western states took in response to the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan.132 These measures did not induce a Soviet withdrawal, and
their deterrent effect is at best speculative.133 Or consider the trade restric-
tions that African states imposed on South Africa in the 1960s, in order to
protest apartheid.134 South African apartheid lasted three more decades.135
Unfriendly unilateralism is meaningful in these cases because it expresses a
126. See David Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Maritime Mammal
Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 154, 158 (1995)
(“[I]t appears quite likely that but for such sanctions several states . . . would have opted out of the
moratorium and continued commercial whaling.”); Charnovitz, supra note 125, at 765 (“Less than a
month after [the United States certified Norway for retaliation], Norway announced that it would sus-
pend commercial whaling. . . .”); Gene S. Martin, Jr. & James W. Brennan, Enforcing the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling: The Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, 17 Denv. J. Int’l
L. & Pol’y 293, 306–07 (1998) (describing U.S. retaliation, followed by “the U.S.S.R.’s announcement
that it had ceased all commercial whaling”). The United States also had modest success inducing compli-
ance with other IWC norms. See Caron, supra, at 157; Charnovitz, supra note 125, at 806 (reviewing
practice and concluding that U.S. retaliations have “been reasonably effective in increasing adherence to
certain international conservation standards”); Martin & Brennan, supra, at 315 (reviewing practice and
concluding that U.S. retaliations “unquestionably have had a salutary effect on the ability of the IWC to
achieve its conservation objectives”); Gerry J. Nagtzaam, The International Whaling Commission and the
Elusive Great White Whale of Preservationism, 33 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 375, 412 (2009).
127. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
128. See Tamara Jones, Rough Seas for Defiant Whalers, L.A. Times, July 6, 1993, at A1; Norway
Whalers Catch Most of 1993 Commercial Quota, Reuter Eur. Bus. Rep., July 2, 1993.
129. Message to Congress on Whaling Activities in Norway, Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2000,
2001 (Oct. 4, 1993) (presidential decision not to act, even though “Norway’s action is serious enough to
justify sanctions”); Caron, supra note 126, at 166–68.
130. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
131. See Tams, supra note 45, at 229 (reviewing countermeasures for erga omnes violations and con-
cluding that “[t]heir actual effects were often rather trivial”).
132. See Dawidowicz, supra note 8, at 364–65; Homer E. Moyer, Jr. & Linda A. Mabry, Export Controls
as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 Law &
Pol’y Int’l Bus. 1, 27–47 (1983).
133. Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Cur-
rent Policy 173 (2d ed. 1990) (“It is unknown what effect, if any, economic sanctions had on Soviet
calculations with respect to adventures in other parts of the world.”).
134. See Dawidowicz, supra note 8, at 353–54 (describing trade embargo and flight and port bans).
135. See Steven Mufson, South Africa 1990, 70 Foreign Aff. 120, 127 (1990).
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commitment to the violated norms. It helps sustain the belief that the viola-
tions are impermissible—that the norms are not purely aspirational, even if
they also are not fully effective.
2. Reconciling Competing Objectives
In other cases, unfriendly unilateralism helps reconcile competing objec-
tives within the law. Reconciling these objectives ex ante can be extraordi-
narily difficult in large multilateral settings.136 Moreover, although
centralized bodies might exist to help reconcile the objectives ex post, such
bodies usually are embedded in a single regime and predisposed to that re-
gime’s principal objectives.137 They might not give competing objectives
sufficient weight. In any event, once a particular balance is struck, re-
calibrating the balance to accommodate new facts or sensibilities can again
be cumbersome. What sometimes happens, then, is that one objective comes
to displace another. Using unfriendly unilateralism can help establish a
more meaningful balance.
For instance, unfriendly unilateralism helped give environmental interests
more weight within the trade regime. The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (“GATT”) allows states unilaterally to restrict trade to “protect
human, animal or plant life or health” or for “the conservation of exhaus-
tible natural resources.”138 In a series of cases—most notoriously, Tuna/
Dolphin—GATT panels interpreted those provisions narrowly, largely
prohibiting unilateral trade restrictions to protect the global environ-
ment.139 These panels were motivated by “an intuition that trade measures
to protect the environment might open the door to ‘green’ protectionism,
thereby threatening [free trade].”140 In other words, the GATT panels were
more interested in protecting the trade regime’s own objectives than in ena-
bling states to preserve the global environment. The panels thus struck a
balance that heavily favored free trade over the global environment.141
136. See Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 Int’l Org. 761,
794–95 (2001).
137. See generally Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law—20 Years Later, 20 Eur. J.
Int’l L. 7, 9 (2009) (explaining that “the creation of special regimes of knowledge and expertise” leads
to “struggle[s] between competing expert vocabularies, each equipped with a specific bias”).
138. GATT, supra note 34, arts. XX(b) & (g).
139. Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1991), 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991); Report of the Panel, United States—Restric-
tions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (Jun. 16, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 936 (1994); cf. Report of the Panel, Thai-
land—Restrictions on Importation of and International Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10/R (Nov. 7, 1990), GATT
B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 ¶ 24 (1990) (requiring least-GATT-inconsistent alternative for health ob-
jective); Report of the Panel, Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, L/6268
(Mar. 22, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 114 (1989) (requiring that conservation restrictions be
focused primarily on domestic production or consumption).
140. Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the
Trade and Environment Debate, 27 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 491, 493 (2002).
141. See, e.g., Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning the Limits of the
World Trade Organization’s Authority, 28 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 711 (1996). GATT bodies proposed
that states seeking to protect the global environment do so either through multilateral negotiations or by
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The United States had long used unilateral trade restrictions for the
global environment and continued to do so after Tuna/Dolphin.142 The U.S.
restrictions varied. Some were like the ones on commercial whaling and
targeted particular states.143 Others applied more generally. For example,
the U.S. restrictions in Tuna/Dolphin prohibited tuna imports from any state
that lacked adequate safeguards for dolphin-safe fishing.144 All of these re-
strictions—both the targeted and the generally applicable—were part of a
broader effort to create more space for the environment within the trade
regime.145 WTO bodies eventually responded by giving states some discre-
tion to use trade restrictions for the global environment.146 Of course, this
shift cannot be credited to the United States alone. But multilateral efforts
to strike a new balance between trade and the environment required a con-
sensus and were going nowhere.147 U.S. unilateralism—including unfriendly
and disobedient unilateralism—played an important role.
3. Strengthening Legal Regimes
Unfriendly unilateralism can also help strengthen legal regimes. In these
cases, a regime begins as only modestly effective at achieving its stated
objectives. Unfriendly unilateralism helps overcome pockets of intransigence
and stimulate a process for reform. In the end, the regime better satisfies its
objectives, with stricter substantive obligations or more serious implementa-
tion devices.
Consider the Air Services arbitration, which arose out of the U.S.-France
aviation agreement and is commonly cited for the doctrine on countermea-
sures.148 The aviation agreement permitted each country’s airlines to transfer
passengers from one aircraft to another aircraft en route to the final destina-
offering new concessions. For a review and critique of this proposal, see Howard F. Chang, An Economic
Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 83 Geo. L.J. 2131 (1995).
142. See Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We
Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (1999) (examining Tuna/
Dolphin’s aftermath).
143. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text.
144. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–711, sec. 4(a),
§ 101(a)(2), 102 Stat. 4755, 4765; Act of July 17, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–364, tit. I, § 101(a)(2), 98 Stat.
440, 440.
145. For evidence that the WTO was under considerable pressure to accommodate environmental
interests, see, for example, Jennifer Schultz, The GATT/WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment:
Toward Environmental Reform, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 423 (1995); Carrie Wofford, A Greener Future at the
WTO: The Refinement of WTO Jurisprudence on Environmental Exceptions to GATT, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
563 (2000).
146. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp & Shrimp Products, ¶
121, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Cer-
tain Shrimp & Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW
(Oct. 22, 2001).
147. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing
Search for Reconciliation, 91 Am. J. Int’l L. 268, 269–71 (1997).
148. Air Services Agreement of Mar. 27, 1946 (U.S./Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417 (1978); see also Draft
Articles, supra note 14, at 75, 128–30, 134–36 (repeatedly citing case to support draft articles); White &
Abass, supra note 66, at 513 (“In ILC terms the paradigm is [Air Services].”).
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tion. But the aviation agreement expressly permitted such transfers only in
France or the United States; the agreement was silent about transfers in
third countries.149 France interpreted the silence as a lack of authorization
and prohibited a U.S. airline from conducting a third-country transfer en
route to Paris. Moreover, France refused to alter its interpretation unless the
United States offered concessions of equivalent value. Meanwhile, the
United States refused to bargain for rights that it believed it already had. It
interpreted the silence to permit third-country transfers, consistent with the
agreement’s purpose of providing air travel “at the cheapest rates consistent
with sound economic principles.”150
France had no need to resolve the dispute expeditiously because prohibit-
ing the service disadvantaged only the United States.151 The United States
thus responded with the threat of unfriendly unilateralism. It ordered the
suspension, within thirty days, of all Air France flights to Los Angeles. This
order galvanized France to resolve the dispute.152 The day before the U.S.
suspension was to go into effect, France and the United States agreed to an
interim arrangement on third-country transfers and to submit their inter-
pretive dispute to arbitration.153 In the end, the arbitral tribunal accepted
the U.S. interpretation and then found that, because France deviated from
that interpretation, the U.S. suspension would have been a lawful counter-
measure.154 With that outcome, the regime better satisfied its goal of ena-
bling economically efficient air services. Yet no matter how the dispute was
resolved, a U.S. suspension would not have satisfied the requirements for
countermeasures; it would not have reinstated the preexisting legal arrange-
ment because that arrangement was silent on third-country transfers.
Rather, the U.S. order helped fill the silence and develop the law, by cata-
lyzing a process for reform.155 Even the paradigm case on countermeasures is
ultimately about generating new law, not reinstating the status quo ante.
The Air Services case is unusual in that a threat of unfriendly unilateralism
led to an arbitral decision that helped reform the regime. The process for
reform is usually more decentralized. Unfriendly unilateralism prompts an
intransigent or uninterested state to take seriously the negotiations and help
find a mutually agreeable solution. The 1995 fishing dispute between Ca-
nada and the European Union (“EU”) is illustrative. The Northwest Atlan-
tic Fisheries Organization (“NAFO”) had just allocated the catch of a
149. Air Services, 18 R.I.A.A. ¶ ¶13, 45–46.
150. Id. ¶ 13 (quoting agreement) (internal quotations omitted).
151. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Retaliation or Arbitration—or Both? The 1978 United States-France Aviation
Dispute, 74 Am. J. Int’l L. 785, 799 (1980) (“[D]elay worked in favor of France since France benefited
from the status quo as it had defined it when it barred the Pan Am service.”).
152. Id. (“One result of the U.S. action was that France had substantially more interest in a speedy
resolution of the dispute. . . .”).
153. Air Services, 18 R.I.A.A. ¶ 9 (reprinting agreement to arbitrate).
154. Id. ¶ 99.
155. Id. ¶ 95 (explaining that the U.S. order “set the procedure in motion” for resolving the interpre-
tive dispute).
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halibut fish stock, giving sixty percent to Canada and thirteen percent to the
EU.156 The EU objected,157 making the allocation nonbinding under the
NAFO treaty.158 The EU then claimed for itself a sixty-nine percent
share.159 Though the EU’s conduct did not violate binding law, it under-
mined NAFO’s overall purpose of cooperatively allocating the halibut
catch.160 Canada responded by arresting and bringing to port a Spanish ship
and by harassing a few other European ships on the high seas.161 Canada’s
conduct was disobedient,162 but it catalyzed serious negotiations.163 Within
six weeks, Canada and the EU agreed to new allocations and stricter over-
sight mechanisms.164 In the end, NAFO’s conservation interests were better
satisfied.
Canada similarly used unfriendly unilateralism to prompt more serious
negotiations with the United States under their Pacific Salmon Treaty.165
The treaty allocated the Pacific salmon catch, but its initial allocations were,
according to the U.S. State Department lawyer who participated in the ne-
gotiations, “necessarily short-term.”166 The treaty’s key innovation was a
bilateral commission that, operating by consensus, would manage fishery
conservation and recommend annual allocations.167 However, the United
States immediately refused to accept new allocations because any change in
156. See Fisheries: EU Formally Objects to NAFO Turbot Quota as Canada Warns Against, Eur. Rep. 2021,
Mar. 3, 1995 [hereinafter EU Objects]; Fisheries: EU and Canada on the Brink of a Fish War, Eur. Rep.
2022, Mar. 7, 1995.
157. See EU Objects, supra note 156.
158. Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries art. XII(1),
Oct. 24, 1978, 1 U.S.T. 477, 1135 U.N.T.S. 369 [hereinafter NAFO Treaty] (entered into force Jan. 1,
1979).
159. See EU Objects, supra note 156.
160. See NAFO Treaty art. II, supra note 158 (establishing NAFO “to contribute through consulta-
tion and cooperation to the optimum utilization, rational management and conservation of the fishery
resources”).
161. See José A. de Yturriaga, The International Regime of Fisheries: From UNCLOS 1982
to the Presential Sea 242–44 (1997).
162.  See UNCLOS, supra note 84, art. 92 (subjecting high-seas vessels to exclusive jurisdiction of flag
state). Canada seemed to appreciate that its conduct was legally suspect. On the same day that it decided
to exercise authority over foreign vessels on the high seas, it withdrew from the ICJ’s compulsory juris-
diction. See Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. 432, ¶ 14–15 (Dec. 4).
163. John Carvel, Trawler Freed as Truce Declared in Fish War, Guardian (London), Mar. 16, 1995, at
3 (reporting that, in exchange for Canada releasing the vessel, “the two sides would meet next week at an
emergency meeting . . . at which the whole controversy . . . could be thrashed out”); Allan Thompson,
European Union, Canada Set for Negotiations on Fish Stocks, Toronto Star (Can.), Mar. 16, 1995, at A12
(quoting EU official as explaining that vessel’s release “ ‘clears the way to begin the process of
negotiation’”).
164. Agreed Minute on the Conservation and Management of Fish Stocks, Can.-Eur. Community,
Apr. 20, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1260; EU/Canada: EU and Canada Celebrate Easter Deal on Fishing Rights, Eur.
Rep. 2034, Apr. 19, 1995.
165. Treaty Concerning Pacific Salmon, U.S.-Can., art. III(1), Jan. 28, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11,091
(entered into force Mar. 17, 1985).
166. Joy A. Yanagida, The Pacific Salmon Treaty, 81 Am. J. Int’l L. 577, 578 (1987).
167. Treaty Concerning Pacific Salmon, supra note 165, arts. II, IV; see also Yanagida, supra note 166,
at 585–88.
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the bilateral regime would create domestic legal and political challenges.168
In obstructing the commission from doing its work, the United States un-
questionably undercut the treaty’s overall purpose and structure. But be-
cause the treaty’s substantive obligations were imprecise, the United States
did not clearly violate the treaty’s letter.169
Canada twice used unfriendly unilateralism to pressure the United States
to take seriously the Pacific salmon negotiations. In 1994, Canada imposed a
fee on U.S. commercial fishing vessels that transited Canada’s Inside Pas-
sage.170 Canada’s fee was inconsistent with longstanding practice and per-
haps disobedient.171 Nevertheless, the fee broke the U.S. domestic logjam
and prompted more serious negotiations.172 After these negotiations also
failed,173 Canada stood by while over 100 Canadian-flagged vessels block-
aded a U.S. passenger ferry in Canadian port for three days.174 Though the
United States reacted noisily,175 it recognized that the blockade “jump
started the negotiations.”176 Canada and the United States worked together
to appoint two special envoys on the Pacific Salmon Treaty, and the envoys’
work set the foundation for finally amending the treaty in 1999.177 Com-
168. See Yanagida, supra note 166, at 577–78, 585–88 (explaining that jurisdiction over U.S. fisheries
is splintered among federal, state, and tribal authorities; “[r]elations among [the different U.S.] groups
are characterized by vigorous competition”; and U.S. action on the commission required a consensus
among those competing U.S. actors).
169. See Treaty Concerning Pacific Salmon, supra note 165, art. III (establishing duties to cooperate
and try to prevent overfishing); Id., Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Implementation of Pa-
cific Salmon Treaty, art. III, ¶ 1(b) (establishing duty to allocate catch equitably); see also UNCLOS, supra
note 84, art. 66(4) (establishing duty to cooperate).
170. See Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations, C.R.C., c. 413 (Can.) (1978), amended by SOR/94-
444 (Can.) (1994); News Release/Communique, Can. Dep’t of Fisheries & Oceans, License Fee An-
nounced for U.S. Vessels, No. NE-HQ-94-5QE (June 9, 1994).
171. See Colin B. Picker, Fishing for Answers in Canada’s Inside Passage: Exploring the Use of the Transit
Fee as a Countermeasure, 21 Yale J. Int’l L. 349, 370–88 (1996) (arguing that the fee did not comply
with Canada’s obligations but should be understood as a countermeasure); but see Ted L. McDorman, The
West Coast Salmon Dispute: A Canadian View of the Breakdown of the 1985 Treaty and the Transit License
Measure, 17 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 477, 497–503 (1995) (arguing that the fee complied with
Canada’s obligations).
172. See Gore’s Assurance on Salmon Lifts Block on Stalled Talks, Victoria Times-Colonist (Can.), July
3, 1994, at A2; Thomas W. Haines, Lifting of Boat Fee Paves Way for Fish Talks to Resume, Seattle Times,
July 3, 1994, at A1; Brian Tobin, License Fee Got Message Through to Americans, Victoria Times-Colo-
nist (Can.), July 29, 1994, at A5.
173. See Brad M. Caldwell, The Pacific Salmon Treaty: A Brief Truce in the Canada/U.S.A. Pacific Salmon
War, 57 Advoc. 379, 385–89 (1999).
174. Id. at 388; Paul L. Evans, Treaty Past, Treaty Present: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of the
Pacific Salmon Treaty Through Examination of the Values, Culture and Political Structures that Provide
Definition 66 (Nov. 14, 2000) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Oregon State University) (on file with Valley
Library, Oregon State University).
175. The U.S. Senate passed a resolution calling on the President to “use all necessary and appropriate
means to compel the Government of Canada to prevent any further illegal or harassing actions” against
U.S. nationals transiting Canadian waters. S. Res. 109, 105th Cong., 143 Cong. Rec. S7965-02 (1997)
(enacted).
176. Jack Branswell, Blockade May Help Win Pact, Victoria Times-Colonist (Can.), Aug. 5, 1997,
at A1 (quoting U.S. Secretary of Commerce William Daley).
177. Agreement Relating to and Amending Annexes I and IV of the Treaty of Jan. 28, 1985, as
Amended, U.S.-Can., June 30, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 630.
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pared to the original, the amended treaty better achieves its goals of conser-
vation and equitable allocations,178 though it too has problems.179
Finally, consider a more controversial example. In the era predating the
WTO, the United States regularly imposed or threatened to impose trade
restrictions on states that violated the GATT or had, in the U.S. view, un-
reasonable trade policies.180 The U.S. restrictions, termed “Section 301 ac-
tions” for the relevant provision of the U.S. Trade Act, were widely
criticized as bullying.181 But as Robert Hudec has explained, these actions
were “an important element in the process of GATT legal reform” and
“made a constructive contribution to breaking legal deadlocks and stimulat-
ing improvements in GATT law.”182
Section 301 actions helped strengthen the trade regime in three respects.
First, the actions regularly prompted bilateral negotiations that led to spe-
cific market openings.183 These openings advanced the regime’s objective of
trade liberalization and often benefited third states.184 Second, 301 actions
helped broaden the regime’s coverage to include the trade in services and
178. First, the 1999 amendment regulates more fisheries. Second, the original treaty depended on the
parties agreeing to annual harvest plans. The failure to agree triggered vague requirements of equity and
conservation. By contrast, the 1999 amendment avoids the need for annual agreement by establishing
precise, long-range harvest plans. Third, the 1999 amendment establishes an “abundance-based” fishing
regime, which defines the harvest as a function of the salmon population. Such abundance-based fishing
is generally more responsive to conservation needs than is harvesting a fixed amount each year, without
regard to the size of the population. Fourth, the 1999 amendment establishes funds for habitat restora-
tion, stock enhancement, and research; and it strengthens information-sharing. For more details on the
1999 amendment, see Karol de Zwager Brown, Truce in the Salmon War: Alternatives for the Pacific Salmon
Treaty, 74 Wash. L. Rev. 605 (1999); Jason Dunn, The 1999 Pacific Salmon Treaty Agreement, 11 Colo. J.
Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 164 (2000).
179. See Austin Williams, The Pacific Salmon Treaty: A Historical Analysis and Prescription for the Future,
22 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 153, 174–75 (2007) (“[T]he Pacific Salmon Treaty remains unable to dis-
tribute equitably the benefits of Pacific salmon between the United States and Canada and fails to guar-
antee habitat conservation.”).
180. See Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
181. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in Aggressive Unilateralism,
supra note 26, 1, 1–2; Alan O. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations:
The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 263, 265 (1992) (“[Officials of other states]
often react with indignity . . . and maintain that the very existence of Section 301 is objectionable.”);
“U.S. Comes Under Attack Over Trade Policy at GATT Council Meeting, Defends Super 301,” 6 Int’l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 830 (June 28, 1989).
182. Hudec, supra note 26, at 116; see also Thomas O. Bayard & Kimberly Ann Elliott, Reci-
procity and Retaliation in U.S. Trade Policy 331 (Inst. for Int’l Econ. ed., 1994) (“American arm-
twisting provided an important incentive for its trading partners to negotiate rules that strengthened the
international trading system and discouraged US unilateralism.”).
183. See Michael P. Ryan, Strategy and Compliance with Bilateral Trade Dispute Settlement Agreements:
USTR’s Section 301 Experience in the Pacific Basin, 12 Mich. J. Int’l L. 799, 809 (1991); Sykes, supra note
181, at 268.
184. Bayard & Elliott, supra note 182, at 334; Sykes, supra note 181, at 295. Some worried that,
when Section 301 actions extracted concessions in areas not covered by the GATT, states would divert
trade to the United States from third states, thus disadvantaging those third states. See Bhagwati, supra
note 181, at 35–36. However, an extensive review of Section 301 actions concluded that any trade
diversion was insignificant. Bayard & Elliott, supra note 182, at 331, 335.
2014 / Unfriendly Unilateralism 135
intellectual property.185 Third, 301 actions were a critical impetus for estab-
lishing the WTO enforcement process.186 In the pre-WTO era, trade dis-
putes were arbitrated, but the dispute resolution process operated by
consensus. Any state, including the scofflaw, could block a decision author-
izing enforcement.187 Now, a WTO decision authorizing enforcement is ef-
fective unless all states, including the victor, object.188 WTO dispute
resolution is widely praised for making the entire regime more effective.189
The Air Services, fishing, and trade cases all follow a similar pattern: un-
friendly unilateralism pressured an intransigent state to take seriously an
existing regime and to try to find a mutually agreeable approach for achiev-
ing the regime’s objectives. Contrary to the doctrine on state responsibility,
these cases are not about remedying one-off defections or restoring preexist-
ing law. They are about changing that law and, in the end, strengthening
the regime.
4. Recalibrating Legal Regimes
States sometimes use unfriendly unilateralism not to advance but to re-
treat from regime objectives. That such a retreat can ever benefit a regime
might seem counterintuitive. But it can help keep states invested in the
regime even after their original bargain becomes untenable.190 States that
participate in complex regimes inevitably confront unanticipated challenges
to compliance, so occasional transgressions are to be expected. Unfriendly
unilateralism is a tool for other states to respond. Specifically, other states can
use unfriendly unilateralism to adjust the regime’s overall balance of rights
and obligations, thus re-stabilizing the regime on terms that all parties are
willing to tolerate. Here again, unfriendly unilateralism is not about rein-
185. Hudec, supra note 26, at 130 (describing this development); Geza Feketekuty, U.S. Policy on 301
and Super 301, in Aggressive Unilateralism, supra note 26, 91, 102 (“[F]oreign concern about poten-
tial 301 actions outside of the GATT framework in areas such as services and intellectual property has
served to increase the interest of many countries in a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round negoti-
ations in these areas.”).
186. See Alan Oxley, The Challenge of Free Trade 75 (1990) (“One of the primary interests of
the European Community in the Uruguay Round was to secure greater commitment from the United
States to use GATT procedures . . . rather than resorting to unilateral action. . . .”); Robert E. Hudec,
The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 Minn. J. Global Trade
1, 13–14 (1999).
187. See John H. Jackson et al., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations:
Cases, Materials, and Text 830 (3d ed. 1995).
188. DSU, supra note 32, art. 9.
189. See John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International
Economic Relations 97 (2d ed. 1997); Mitsuo Matsushita et al., The World Trade Organiza-
tion: Law, Practice, and Policy 103–39 (2d ed. 2006).
190. This insight builds on the literature on so-called “flexibility provisions.” This literature demon-
strates that treaty provisions that allow states unilaterally to change or deviate from particular commit-
ments can deepen the cooperative relationship. States might accept more onerous obligations if they
know that they have a lawful way out. See e.g., Jeffrey Kucik & Eric Reinhardt, Does Flexibility Promote
Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime, 62 Int’l Org. 477 (2008). The argument in the
text is that states that are committed to a relationship are more likely to stay committed if they can
meaningfully adjust the regime in response to transgressions.
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stating the preexisting arrangement. The recalibration might last indefi-
nitely. Unlike the cases just examined, however, the recalibration makes the
regime less effective overall. This outcome can still be preferable to the alter-
natives: requiring innocents either to terminate the legal relationship or to
accept the scofflaw’s new terms.191
The Canada-Brazil dispute on aerospace subsidies illustrates the point.
The WTO found that each country gave unlawful subsidies to its aerospace
industry.192 Brazil initially modified but did not terminate its subsidies,193
so the WTO authorized Canada to impose trade restrictions on Brazil as
countermeasures.194 These restrictions were not in Canada’s economic inter-
est, in part because Brazil might have responded by retaliating against Ca-
nada’s subsidies.195 Thus, Canada began matching Brazil’s subsidies on an
order-by-order basis. Canada defended its matching subsidies, which were
disobedient, on the ground that they simply mirrored Brazil’s.196 For years,
each country continued to give heavy subsidies to its aerospace industry.197
This equilibrium was suboptimal from a WTO perspective but limited the
extent to which the subsidies dispute infected the broader trade relationship.
191. The process of transgression plus recalibration is imperfect for other reasons, as well. First, in
multilateral regimes, the transgression might disadvantage many states, even as the recalibration benefits
only the acting state. See Andrea Bianchi & Lorenzo Gradoni, Developing Countries, Countermeasures and
WTO Law: Reinterpreting the DSU against the Background of International Law, Int’l Centre for Trade &
Sustainable Dev. Programme on Dispute Resolution, Issue Paper 5, at 14 (2008) (identifying this prob-
lem in trade law). Renegotiating the entire arrangement would better protect all states but might be
infeasible. See Koremenos et al., supra note 136. Second, any unilateral recalibration might be dispropor-
tionate to the original violation. Tolerating the recalibration thus might inhibit economically efficient
transgressions. See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute
Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. Legal Stud. S179, S202–03 (2002). But third-party
mechanisms might be unavailable or ill-equipped to oversee the recalibration.
192. Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug.
2, 1999); Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/
AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999).
193. Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, Recourse by Canada to
Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/AB/RW (July 21, 2000). Brazil modified its subsidies program a
second time, after its initial modification was deemed insufficient. A WTO panel found that the second
modification was lawful on its face. Panel Report, Brazil—Export Financing for Aircraft, Second Recourse by
Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, ¶ 6.2, WT/DS46/RW/2 (July 26, 2001) (“[I]t is legally possible for
Brazil to operate the [subsidies] programme in such a way that it [is lawful].”). However, the panel
acknowledged that the program might still be unlawful as applied. Id. ¶ 6.3.
194. Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/ARB
(Aug. 28, 2000).
195. See 1 The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis 1363
(Patrick F.J. Macrory et al. eds., 2005); Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis, & Robert W. Staiger, The
Case for Tradable Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, 14 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper
No. 3314, 2004).
196. Panel Report, Canada—Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222/R
(Jan. 28, 2002) (finding Canada’s subsidies unlawful); id. ¶ 7.182 on page 46 (describing Canada’s
matching defense); Decision by the Arbitrator, Canada—Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional
Aircraft, ¶ 3.29, WT/DS222/ARB (Feb. 17, 2003) (same).
197. See Marc D. Froese, Canada at the WTO: Trade Litigation and the Future of Public
Policy 90–92 (2010).
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Similarly, the United States recently recalibrated its aviation relationship
with Argentina. After the 2002 devaluation of the Argentine peso, Argen-
tina permitted its airlines to pay in pesos for the use of Buenos Aires Ezeiza
airport.198 U.S. airlines still paid in dollars, so they paid three times as
much.199 That disparate treatment violated the bilateral aviation agreement
and disadvantaged U.S. airlines in the U.S.-Argentine market.200 But for
domestic legal and political reasons, Argentina was unwilling to change its
behavior.201 The United States thus used unfriendly unilateralism to re-
calibrate the aviation relationship. The United States required Argentina’s
principal airline to deposit in escrow, on a per-flight basis, the difference
between what it and U.S. airlines paid at Ezeiza.202 The new arrangement—
under which each country’s airlines paid more in the other country—was to
remain in effect indefinitely. It allowed the aviation relationship to continue
relatively uninterrupted, notwithstanding Argentina’s seemingly intractable
breach.203
Of course, states might recalibrate the regime by using the threat of un-
friendly unilateralism to extract concessions for the transgression. Two
WTO cases demonstrate the dynamic, even though neither involved uni-
lateralism. In United States—Upland Cotton, the WTO authorized Brazil to
take countermeasures for the United States’ unlawful cotton subsidies.204
The subsidies were entrenched in U.S. domestic politics and unlikely to
change in the near term. Thus, Brazil used the threat of countermeasures to
extract a concession. Now, the United States subsidizes its own cotton in-
dustry and compensates Brazil’s.205 In the EC-Hormones dispute, U.S. and
Canadian countermeasures were ineffective at inducing Europe to lift its un-
lawful prohibition of hormone-treated beef.206 The parties eventually re-
calibrated their relationship. Europe still prohibits hormone-treated beef,
198. See Aerolineas Argentinas S.A. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 415 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
199. Id. at 3.
200. Air Transport Services Agreement, U.S.-Arg., art. VII, Oct. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11,262.
201. See Aerolineas Argentinas, 415 F.3d at 2.
202. Id. at 3–4.
203. In 2011, Argentina finally resolved its domestic impediments to compliance, and the parties
reinstated their original agreement. See Aerolineas Argentinas, S.A., Order 2011-10-21, Docket DOT-
OST-2003-15092 (U.S. Dep’t of Transp. Oct. 26, 2011), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!docu-
mentDetail;D=DOT-OST-2003-15092-0466 (order to show cause, preliminarily terminating escrow
payments); Aerolineas Argentinas, S.A., Order 2011-11-15, Docket DOT-OST-2003-15092 (U.S. Dep’t
of Transp. Nov. 14, 2011), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOT-OST-
2003-15092-0467 (order terminating payments).
204. See WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 19
November 2009, ¶ 87, WT/DSB/M/276 (Jan. 29, 2010); Decision by the Arbitrator, United States—
Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 6.1, WT/DS267/ARB/1 (Aug. 31, 2009) (authorizing countermeasures).
205. Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. and Braz. Regarding a Fund for Technical
Assistance and Capacity Building with Respect to the Cotton Dispute (WT/DS267) in the World Trade
Organization, U.S.-Braz., Apr. 20, 2010, T.I.A.S. 10-420, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/143669.pdf; see also John Baffes, Cotton Subsidies, the WTO, and the ‘Cotton Problem’ (World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5663, 2011).
206. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC—Hormones
Dispute, ¶¶ 9–11, WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008).
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but it permits the United States and Canada more market access for high-
quality beef.207
The unfriendliness in these cases is not about restoring a pre-breach status
quo. The acting state intends for its recalibration to last indefinitely, at least
into the medium term and without any obvious end point. It recalibrates
the relationship to establish a new equilibrium, after the original one has
been upset.
B. Correcting Procedural Deficiencies
The practice demonstrates that states sometimes use unfriendly unilater-
alism, including disobedient measures, to help make international law. The
practice also reveals why lawmaking is so critical. If international law is to
govern meaningfully, it must be capable of preserving, reconciling,
strengthening, and recalibrating its various norms. Of course, such lawmak-
ing might and ideally would occur through formal processes or without un-
friendly unilateralism. But as international law already recognizes on
enforcement, its formal processes are sometimes inadequate. Unfriendly uni-
lateralism can be a useful corrective.208
Unfriendly unilateralism can compensate for different kinds of procedural
deficiencies. Sometimes, unfriendly unilateralism reinforces a collective deci-
sion, in the absence of a meaningful alternative for making that decision
effective. Recall that the International Whaling Commission lacked any for-
mal mechanism for binding all states to the commercial whaling morato-
rium, let alone for inducing all states to comply. Unfriendly unilateralism
helped make the moratorium effective.209 Similarly, in the Norway-Iceland
fishing dispute, unfriendly unilateralism supported emerging expectations
on the duty to cooperate in UNCLOS. At the time of the dispute, Norway
and Iceland had both been participating in multilateral negotiations on the
straddling fish stocks agreement. However, this formal lawmaking process
207. See Memorandum of Understanding between Canada and E.C. Regarding the Importation of
Beef from Animals not Treated with Certain Growth-Promoting Hormones and Increased Duties Ap-
plied by Can. To Certain Products of the E.C., Mar. 17, 2011, in Joint Communication from the E.U.
and Can., European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS48/26
(Mar. 22, 2011); Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Euro-
pean Commission Regarding the Importation of Beef from Animals not Treated with Certain Growth-
Promoting Hormones and Increased Duties Applied by the United States to Certain Products of the
European Communities, May 13, 1999, in Joint Communication from the European Communities and
the United States; European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/
DS48/28 (Sept. 30, 2009) available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/november/tradoc_
145411.pdf.
208. Cf. Allen Buchanan, Human Rights, Legitimacy, and the Use of Force 301 (2010)
(arguing that illegal acts of reform can be morally justified, in part because the international system is
“more in need of improvement [than developed legal systems] and less endowed with resources for
relatively expeditious lawful improvement”).
209. See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text.
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was protracted and incomplete.210 Iceland exploited the delay to overfish and
potentially to set the foundation for a long-term claim on Barents Sea
fish.211 The unfriendly unilateralism in these incidents supported not the
acting state’s own agenda but rather a widely shared and collective agenda.
Moreover, the acting state did not circumvent but rather worked through
the designated international process for pursuing that agenda. The desig-
nated process was just insufficient.
Even when formal processes are technically available, they might be inef-
fective or unreliable in specific kinds of cases. For example, states looking to
address human rights atrocities could seek Security Council authorization
before acting unfriendly. At least in some cases, these states could also file a
formal complaint before a human rights court or treaty body. However,
states rarely pursue those options.212 The Security Council is unreliable in
human rights cases, and the complaint mechanisms under the human rights
treaties are cumbersome. Rather, the routine process for addressing gross
human rights violations is anarchic. Varied global actors address these viola-
tions in multiple, disconnected arenas. States that use unfriendly unilateral-
ism to preserve human rights norms usually tap into that anarchic process.
Take a concrete example. In 2005, the United States and Europe acted un-
friendly toward Uzbekistan after Uzbekistan refused to investigate mass
killings in Andijan.213 Though the United States and Europe acted unilater-
ally, they acted in concert with the U.N. General Assembly.214 Their un-
friendly unilateralism reinforced the General Assembly’s collective decision
that Uzbekistan had acted badly. The United States and Europe did not
exhaust every available process before using unfriendly unilateralism, but
neither did they undercut the ordinary human rights process.
The same might be said of the unfriendly unilateralism against Iran, al-
though this is a more difficult case. Recall that, until 2010, when the Secur-
ity Council authorized a broad range of unfriendly measures against Iran,
several states were taking such measures unilaterally. Some might view this
210. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. In addition, trilateral negotiations involving Norway,
Iceland, and Russia had failed to resolve the dispute. See Robin R. Churchill, The Barents Sea Loophole
Agreement: A “Coastal State” Solution to a Straddling Stock Problem, 14 Int’l J. Maritime & Coastal L.
467, 471 (1999).
211. See Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 85, art. 7(2)(e), 11(b) (defining cooperation in
part by each state’s previous fishing patterns and dependence on a given stock).
212. See Christian J. Tams, Individual States as Guardians of Community Interests, in From Bilateral-
ism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma 379, 383–85, 388 (Ulrich Fas-
tenrath et al. eds., 2011) (“[N]one of the universal human rights bodies has ever been seized with a
single inter-State application.”).
213. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 685, 121 Stat. 2361
(travel bans); U.S. Dep’t of State, FY 2005 U.S. Assistance to Eurasia, available at http://www.
state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/63182.htm (aid restrictions); Council Common Position (EC) No. 2005/792/CFSP
of 14 November 2005, arts. 1–3, 2005 O.J. (L 299) 72 (aid restrictions and suspension of meeting under
the EU-Uzbek Partnership and Cooperation Agreement).
214. See G.A. Res. 60-174, ¶ 4(a), U.N. Doc. GA/RES/60/174 (Mar. 14, 2006); see also Cleveland,
supra note 26 (describing unilateral but coordinated unfriendliness against Burma).
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unfriendly unilateralism as circumventing the more formal processes at the
IAEA and Security Council.215 After all, the IAEA and Council were seized of
Iran’s case, and the Council had by 2006 required or authorized a discrete set
of unfriendly acts against Iran. Even so, the states that used unfriendly uni-
lateralism did not avoid the IAEA or Council. To the contrary, these states
worked hard to obtain IAEA and Council decisions on Iran.216 And the un-
friendly unilateralism supported, rather than undercut, those collective deci-
sions.217 The IAEA, the Security Council, and the states that acted
unilaterally were all pursuing the same agenda against Iran. They were try-
ing to pressure Iran to stop enriching uranium and accept a more intrusive
oversight arrangement.
In other cases, unfriendly unilateralism did not reinforce a collective deci-
sion that had already been made but rather catalyzed a stagnant or dysfunc-
tional decisionmaking process. In the Canada-EU and Canada-U.S. fishing
disputes, the designated processes for allocating fish had malfunctioned. The
EU disregarded NAFO’s allocation and then unilaterally claimed for itself a
much larger share. The United States was intransigent on the bilateral com-
mission for allocating Pacific salmon. Canada used unfriendly unilateralism
only after those processes had failed and only to trigger collective deci-
sions.218 In particular, Canada did not purport to impose its preferred alloca-
tions on the targets. By contrast, the United States was more assertive in
using Section 301 actions to help develop the trade regime. Some 301 ac-
tions advanced U.S. policies that had not yet been accepted by other states.
Moreover, the United States sometimes used 301 actions to demand conces-
sions without offering any concessions of its own. The United States thus
left the impression that it sought not to instigate good-faith negotiations
but rather to dictate its preferred norms.219 Unsurprisingly, such 301 actions
were especially controversial.220
215. See Dupont, supra note 23, at 333–34; cf. Summary Records of the Meetings of the 44th Session, [1992]
1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 144, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1992 (comments of Alain Pellet (France)) (argu-
ing that Security Council action should terminate the right to take countermeasures).
216. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Administration Presses its Case Against Iran Abroad, N.Y. Times, June 8,
2010, at A13 (discussing U.S. efforts at Security Council); Thom Shanker, Security Council Votes to Tighten
Iran Sanctions, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 2007, at A11 (reporting on effort to achieve “a unanimous vote that
would symbolize united world opinion against Iran’s nuclear ambitions”); Steven R. Weisman, Allies
Resist U.S. Efforts to Pressure Iran on Arms, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 2004, at A13 (“The United States has
tried and failed five times to get the votes to refer the matter to the Security Council . . . .”).
217. See supra note 25; cf. Letter dated May 2, 2008 from Alejandro Wolff, Deputy Permanent Repre-
sentative of the United States of America to the United Nations, to the Chairman of the Security Council
Committee, Annex at 2, UN Doc. S/AC.50/2008/34 (May 13, 2008) (encouraging states to take unilat-
eral measures that are “complementary to those explicitly required by UNSCR 1803 to achieve the
international community’s ultimate objective”).
218. See supra notes 156–79 and accompanying text.
219. See Bhagwati, supra note 181, at 5.
220. See Bayard & Elliott, supra note 182, at 71 (explaining that critics resent “when the United
States unilaterally determines that a foreign practice that violates no international agreement is ‘unrea-
sonable,’ demands unilateral concessions, and unilaterally retaliates”); Bhagwati, supra note 181, at 3
(coining the term “aggressive unilateralism” to describe 301 actions for GATT-legal conduct).
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Finally, unfriendly unilateralism sometimes just filled a procedural void.
Consider the cases in which states used unfriendly unilateralism to re-
calibrate relationships that had already been unilaterally altered. A good
formal alternative for achieving that end did not exist. Sure, the acting states
could have tried to renegotiate with the scofflaws in order to find a new
equilibrium. But the scofflaws had already claimed what they themselves
wanted; they lacked much incentive to agree to changes that would operate
only to their detriment. Moreover, although a third-party body was in some
cases available to reinforce the original bargain, such bodies are not always
equipped to restructure relationships.221 In the Canada-Brazil dispute on
aerospace subsidies, the U.S.-Brazil dispute on cotton subsidies, and the EC-
Hormones dispute, WTO bodies authorized countermeasures to reinstate the
law as it was. But that remedy was inapt because the scofflaws were intent
on changing the law. Unfriendliness helped move the regime to a new and
more stable third place.
IV. Unfriendly, Unilateral, Sometimes Noncompliant (Redux)
This Article has challenged the idea, which pervades the scholarly litera-
ture and drives the doctrine on state responsibility, that unfriendly unilater-
alism’s principal legal function is to enforce law. Unfriendly unilateralism
also helps generate law. And like for enforcement, using it for lawmaking
can all things considered be good for the international legal order. Enforce-
ment and lawmaking can both occur in formal channels or without un-
friendly unilateralism. But they do not always. Unfriendly unilateralism can
fill that procedural void and help keep the law relevant.
Still, some readers are likely to insist that unfriendly unilateralism should
not be used in lawmaking, except insofar as the doctrine already permits.
The doctrine on state responsibility strikes a delicate balance between the
interest in preventing abuse and the interest in enforcement. The worry,
then, is that tolerating more unfriendly unilateralism in lawmaking could:
(1) increase the burdens on the principle of sovereign equality, or (2) tilt the
international order toward power politics and away from the rule of law.
However, that worry has never justified a blanket prohibition of unfriendly
unilateralism, or even of unfriendly unilateralism that is noncompliant. Such
conduct has long been tolerated for enforcement and is not inherently more
troubling just because it is used for lawmaking.
A. Preserving Sovereign Equality
Some readers might worry that unfriendly unilateralism is inherently
more troubling when it is used for lawmaking than when it is used for
221. Cf., e.g., Gabcı́kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶¶ 140–41 (Sept. 25)
(“It is not for the Court . . . [but] for the Parties themselves to find an agreed solution that takes account
of the objectives of the Treaty . . . .”).
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enforcement. With enforcement, the acting state simply pressures a target to
comply with existing law. The target presumably has accepted the norm as
law. By contrast, an acting state that uses unfriendly unilateralism in law-
making seems to pressure the target both to accept the norm as law and to
comply with the norm in the specific circumstances. The lawmaking scena-
rio thus might appear to intrude more on the target’s sovereign equality.
However, that depiction of how unfriendly unilateralism works in lawmak-
ing is deeply incomplete.
First, the lawmaking perspective demonstrates that conduct that can eas-
ily be characterized as enforcement is commonly also prescriptive. And the
prescriptive component can be quite substantial. Consider a norm that is
legally binding but only marginally effective. This arrangement might re-
flect not a failure in enforcement but rather a legislative compromise. States
might never have agreed to the norm if it were to be fully effective.222 Uni-
laterally increasing the level at which the norm is enforced would betray a
legislative compromise and amount to active lawmaking. Likewise, a state
that unilaterally enforces a new or contested interpretation of a norm is en-
gaged in lawmaking. When Norway enforced a nascent interpretation of the
UNCLOS duty to cooperate, and when the United States enforced its pre-
ferred interpretation of the U.S.-France aviation agreement, they were help-
ing to develop the law. They were not simply giving effect to the law as it
was.
Second, unfriendly unilateralism does not necessarily intrude less on the
target’s sovereign prerogatives when it can reasonably be labeled “enforce-
ment” than when it cannot. Compare the United States’ conduct in the Air
Services case with Canada’s conduct in the EU fishing dispute. Canada was
not enforcing a legal obligation against the EU because the EU was entitled
to opt out of NAFO’s allocation. Still, it is not at all clear that Canada
intruded more on the EU’s sovereign prerogatives than the United States
intruded on France’s. Canada and the United States both advanced their own
interests, but neither unilaterally made law or overrode its adversary’s sover-
eign prerogatives. Unfriendly unilateralism simply pressured the adversary
to negotiate more seriously and try harder to find a mutually agreeable
solution.
Third and related, a state that uses unfriendly unilateralism cannot by
itself create law. Because lawmaking is an interactive process, it depends on
multiple actors accepting a given claim as law.223 Canada did not alone es-
222. See Reisman, Soft Law, supra note 92, at 137, 139.
223. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), 1969 ICJ Rep. 3, 44 (Feb. 20);
Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 1, 39 (1975) (“When
acts or claims by some States encounter protests from other States, the acts (or claims) and protests often
cancel each other out, with the result that no rule of customary law comes into being.”); Jonathan I.
Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law, 56 Brit. Y.B.
Int’l L. 1, 22 (1986) (“[T]he persistent objector rule serves to soften the threat that the force of ‘law’
will impose a new and objectionable rule on the State that is content with the status quo.”); Reisman,
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tablish the new legal rules on allocating North Atlantic halibut, just as
Iceland did not alone establish the 200-mile exclusive economic zone in the
law of the sea. These states used unfriendly unilateralism to stimulate an
iterative process that legitimized certain norms as law. Had other states re-
jected, instead of accepted, those norms, the law might have shifted in an
entirely different direction. Indeed, one reason that unfriendly unilateralism
is not more common in lawmaking224 might be that it risks antagonizing
other states—which can delegitimize and thus undercut the lawmaking ef-
fort.225 A state that exploits its power to impose its nationalistic agenda on
the target, without hooking into some source of legitimacy, might get what
it wants in a particular case but is unlikely to generate a stable and effective
legal norm.226
Finally, even if unfriendly unilateralism is more offensive when it is used
for lawmaking than when it is used for enforcement, the solution is not to
adhere in all instances to the doctrine on state responsibility. Recall that the
doctrine gives states full discretion over retorsions. These measures can be
quite damaging to the target and corrosive to its sovereign equality. Imag-
ine if the United States suddenly terminated the vast aid that it has for
decades given Egypt.227 The aid is not legally required, but terminating it
would hurt Egypt more than would most proscribed acts.228 Indeed, because
the doctrine is so indulgent of retorsions and suspect of the alternatives, it
Lawmaking, supra note 88, at 110 (explaining that the audience ultimately determines whether a norm is
authoritative). Some skeptics of international law assume that the law simply mirrors the interests of
powerful states—which, in cases of unfriendly unilateralism, would mean the interests of the acting
states. See, e.g., Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979); Stephen D. Kras-
ner, International Law and International Relations: Together, Apart, Together?, 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 93, 95
(2000); but cf. Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 31, 31 (2000) (“[Third
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) seek] to understand, deconstruct, and unpack the uses
of international law as a medium for the creation and perpetuation of a racialized hierarchy . . . that
subordinate[s] non-Europeans to Europeans.”). However, I along with most other legal scholars reject
that view. See Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 Am. J. Int’l
L. 64, 86 (2006) (“Most commentators are confident that international law has at least some autono-
mous power.”).
224. States often refrain from using unfriendly unilateralism even when it would be lawful. See, e.g.,
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 42, at 32–33 (“[S]anctioning authority is . . . rarely used when granted.”);
Noortman, supra note 70, at 194 (reviewing five incidents to conclude that “states do not easily resort
to countermeasures”); Tams, supra note 45, at 230 (“[P]ractice [on erga omnes violations] . . . does not
suggest that the recognition of a right to take countermeasures would necessarily lead to ‘mob violence’
or a ‘reign of chaos.’ ”).
225. See Hurd, Legitimacy, supra note 38, at 385 (explaining that unfriendliness “reduces the likeli-
hood that the [target] will comply without coercion in the future.”).
226. See Claude, supra note 38, at 368, 375 (“Legitimacy . . . makes all rulers more effective.”);
Krzysztof J. Pelc, Constraining Coercion? Legitimacy and its Role in US Trade Policy, 1975-2000, 64 Int’l
Org. 65 (2010) (demonstrating that legitimacy increases likelihood that target will comply); Alexander
Thompson, The Rational Enforcement of International Law: Solving the Sanctioners’ Dilemma, 1 Int’l Theory
307 (2009) (explaining that legitimacy increases likelihood that third states will support an action).
227. See Jeremy M. Sharp, Cong. Research Serv., RL32260, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the
Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2011 Request 24 (2010)
(describing aid).
228. U.S. Dep’t State, Background Note: Egypt, State.gov (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
ei/bgn/5309.htm (describing U.S. aid as “an important pillar of the bilateral relationship”).
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creates the perverse incentive to use retorsions even when they are more
damaging.229 Accepting unfriendly unilateralism in lawmaking only insofar
as the doctrine permits might be counterproductive, if the goal is to pre-
serve states’ sovereign equality.
B. Blending Law with Power
Readers still might worry that inviting unfriendly unilateralism—and es-
pecially disobedient measures—in lawmaking would undercut the rule of
law. International lawyers generally accept that international law and power
politics are intertwined,230 but many assume that the two pull in opposite
directions: the more decisions reflect unilateral power, the less rooted they
are in law.231 Thus, even lawyers who appreciate the enforcement value of
unfriendly unilateralism bemoan that it is a “crude and unhappy way of
responding to unlawful conduct.”232 Most prefer for enforcement to be su-
pervised by third parties,233 because stripping discretion from individual
states is said to “strengthen the primacy of the rule of law.”234 Moreover,
most assume that disobedience necessarily undercuts the rule of law.235
229. Cf. Kimberley N. Trapp, State Responsibility for International Terrorism 203 (2011)
(finding that states sometimes use retorsions where noncompliance would or might be unlawful).
230. See generally Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 223 (reviewing legal literature).
231. See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads 7 (2007)
(describing the common internationalist goal of replacing power politics with law); John H. Jackson,
The World Trading System 110 (2d ed. 1997) (“[T]he history of civilization may be described as a
gradual evolution from a power-oriented approach . . . towards a rule-oriented approach.”); Shaw, supra
note 66, at 12 (“Power politics stresses competition, conflict and supremacy . . .[, but] law aims for
harmony and the regulation of disputes.”); Cherif Bassiouni, The Permanent International Criminal Court, in
Justice for Crimes Against Humanity 173–210 (Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands eds., 2003) (cele-
brating the International Criminal Court as a move from politics to law); Andreas L. Paulus, International
Law After Postmodernism: Towards Renewal or Decline of International Law?, 14 Leiden J. Int’l L. 727, 748,
751 (2001) (“[P]olitics without legal bounds . . . [is] a society subjected to the unfettered, unabashed,
unashamed exercise of power.”); César Sepúlveda, Methods and Procedures for the Creation of Legal Norms in
the International System of States: An Inquiry into the Progressive Development of International Law in the Present
Era, 33 German Y.B. Int’l L. 432, 442 (1990) (“What the jurist should aspire to . . . is for the scope of
international law to be increased and for political power to be reasonably restricted. . . .”).
232. James Crawford, Counter-measures as Interim Measures, 5 Eur. J. Int’l L. 65, 66 (1994).
233. See infra notes 253–57 and accompanying text.
234. Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Fifth Report on State Responsibility, supra note 61, at
16; see also, e.g., Rachel Brewster, Shadow Unilateralism: Enforcing International Trade Law at the WTO, 30
U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 1133, 1140 (2009) (explaining that a dispute involving countermeasures “tends to be
based on politics . . . rather than the legal merits”); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International
Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 709, 723 (1999) (“[I]nternational
jurisdictions [are] essential tools for . . . the furtherance of the international rule of law.”); Yuval Shany,
No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New International Judiciary, 20 Eur.
J. Int’l L. 73, 90 (2009) (“Clearly, the emergence of the new international judiciary advances the rule of
international law . . . .”); but cf. Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38
Tex. Int’l L.J. 405, 415 (2003) (underscoring that third-party mechanisms are not shielded from
politics).
235. See, e.g., sources at supra notes 42–43.
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This Article has resisted that view.236 I have argued that unilateral and
even disobedient exercises of state power can support international law.237
They can help overcome inaction or give effect to collective decisions. To
tolerate unfriendly unilateralism in lawmaking is not to accept an interna-
tional order that is rooted in state power at the law’s expense. It is to accept
that the international order sometimes uses state power in order to make the
law relevant or effective. Indeed, this is precisely why international law al-
ready permits unfriendly unilateralism for enforcement.
Still, readers might have two lingering and related objections. First, some
might worry that unfriendly unilateralism benefits only a handful of power-
house states. It does not. Iceland’s position on the exclusive economic zone is
now law, even though Iceland was by conventional standards less powerful
than the United Kingdom.238 Conventional standards for appraising power
are often misleading because power depends on what each state wants and
can offer in the relationship.239 A powerhouse that is deeply invested in a
legal relationship has more to lose from disrupting that relationship than
does a small and disinterested state that can easily walk away.240 Moreover, a
weak state that is not itself in a position to use unfriendly unilateralism
might well benefit from the actions of more powerful states.241
Second, readers might object that noncompliance necessarily undercuts
the rule of law by eroding the strayed-from norm. It does not. Because un-
friendly unilateralism is targeted at a specific state, the negative repercus-
sions can be fairly limited. The acting state usually can communicate to the
target the reason for the noncompliance. And where the acting state strays
from a multilateral norm, it strays only against the target. It still complies
in its relations with all other states. That pattern of behavior does not neces-
sarily communicate a general retreat from the norm.
236. For a more general argument that illegal acts of reform can be consistent with a commitment to
the rule of law ideal, see Buchanan, supra note 208, at 306–15.
237. Cf. Timothy Meyer, Soft Law as Delegation, 32 Fordham Int’l L. J. 888, 941 (2009) (arguing
that unilateralism by powerful states can benefit international law by “allowing states to capture some of
the benefits, in terms of credibility, of legalizing cooperative rules as well as the welfare gains from
having a market leadership mechanism through which legal rules can be modified over time”).
238. See supra notes 107–11 and accompanying text; see also Louis Henkin, Politics and the Changing
Law of the Sea, 89 Pol. Sci. Q. 46, 47(1974) (“Today the law [of the sea] is being molded by many states,
principally weaker and poorer states. . . .”).
239. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., Political Science Research on International Law: The State of the
Field, 106 Am. J. Int’l L. 47, 51–60 (2012) (reviewing international relations literature on power).
240. See Timothy Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in International Law, 51 Harv. Int’l L.J.
379, 383 (2010) (“[S]tates with little to gain from existing rules are ‘powerful’ . . . pre-
cisely because their outside options likely present them with credible threats to walk
away from existing rules of cooperation.”).
241. Stowell, supra note 53, at 46–49.
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V. Implications
Blanket objections to the use of unfriendly unilateralism in lawmaking—
or to the use of disobedient measures in lawmaking—do not hold. Yet my
argument that unfriendly unilateralism sometimes is and should be used in
lawmaking raises several follow-up questions. I identify below three ques-
tions that warrant further study, and I sketch some preliminary answers.
A. Normative Implications
My claim that unfriendly unilateralism is sometimes desirable in lawmak-
ing leaves open the question of when it is desirable. The doctrine on state
responsibility limits the answer to retorsions. Retorsions are said to be toler-
able because they comply with existing law. I have already argued that com-
pliance is too crude a metric for assessing unfriendly unilateralism.
Compliant conduct can be quite destructive to the target, and noncompliant
conduct can, all things considered, be beneficial. Rather, a normative ap-
praisal should also account for three other factors.
First, the appraisal should consider the nexus between the unfriendly uni-
lateralism and more collective processes or decisions. As I have already ar-
gued, unilateralism is disparately justifiable. Unilateral decisions are
troubling when they circumvent an established and effective process in order
to advance the acting state’s own agenda. Some U.S. Section 301 actions
probably fall in that camp. The United States used these actions, outside any
international process, in order to push for substantive norms that were still
highly contested. By contrast, unilateral decisions are considerably less
troubling when they compensate for deficiencies in the available interna-
tional processes and advance a collective agenda. Good examples might in-
clude Canada’s conduct in the fishing dispute with the EU, and the U.S. and
European measures in response to Uzbekistan’s human rights failings.
Second, the severity of the unfriendliness also matters. In most of the
cases discussed above, the unfriendliness was extremely mild. Yet severe un-
friendliness can be devastating to the target state or population. This un-
friendliness should give decisionmakers pause, no matter whether the
conduct complies or is unilateral.242 For instance, almost all of the unfriend-
liness against Iran has, since mid-2010, been compliant or authorized by the
242. See, e.g., Drezner, supra note 41 (reviewing concerns about the potential severity of multilateral
sanctions); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Debating the Law of Sanctions, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 63, 75–78 (2002)
(arguing that multilateral sanctions should be proportional even if they are otherwise lawful); W.
Michael Reisman & Douglas L. Stevick, The Applicability of International Law Standards to United Nations
Economic Programmes, 9 Eur. J. Int’l L. 86, 128 (1998) (arguing that severe unfriendliness should be
necessary and proportional); cf. Draft Articles, supra note 14, at 130 (“[A] State which has committed an
internationally wrongful act does not thereby make itself the target for any form or combination of
countermeasures, irrespective of their severity or consequences.”).
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U.N. Security Council.243 This unfriendliness is discomfiting, even if it ulti-
mately is justifiable, because it has caused Iran considerable distress.244
Third, any normative appraisal should consider the substantive agenda
being pursued. Unfriendly unilateralism might be especially justifiable
when it advances communal interests, like the global environment or human
rights and security. This idea already motivates the literature on enforcing
erga omnes obligations. Yet regimes that are supposed to advance commu-
nal interests confront challenges not only to enforcement but also to law-
making. Some states see no particular benefit to developing or
strengthening these regimes and can stymie efforts for reform. Meanwhile,
because the regimes are ultimately not designed to balance the interests of
individual states, catering too much to particular holdout states is insensi-
ble.245 States might justifiably use unfriendly unilateralism in order to over-
come pockets of intransigence and advance these interests. In fact, many of
the cases discussed above involve interests that can reasonably be character-
ized as communal.246
To be clear, the substantive interests at stake might be sufficiently
weighty even if they are not in any meaningful sense communal. Recall
Iceland’s conduct to expand the exclusive economic zone. Establishing a
200-mile zone was not in all states’ economic interests. At the time, devel-
oped states with advanced technologies benefitted from distant fishing off
the coasts of newly independent, developing states.247 Pushing for a 200-
mile zone helped redistribute some of the world’s maritime resources from
those developed states to coastal, developing states. Such redistributive ends
might help justify unfriendly, unilateral, and at times disobedient means.
B. Doctrinal Implications
The doctrine on state responsibility, which focuses exclusively on the
compliance question, is extremely unlikely to change through formal chan-
nels. The Draft Articles on State Responsibility took decades of work and
are now part of the fabric of international law.248 States have no apparent
appetite for reopening the draft articles or negotiating an alternative instru-
ment on unfriendly unilateralism. Nevertheless, this Article has exposed a
gap between the black letter doctrine on state responsibility and the prac-
243. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
244. See Thomas Erdbrink & Clifford Krauss, Oil Backed Up, Iranians Put It On Idled Ships, N.Y.
Times, July 4, 2012, at A1; Joby Warrick, Iran Faces Deepening Economic Turmoil, Wash. Post, June 17,
2012, at A4.
245. See Robert Howse, The End of the Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1528,
1533, 1542 (2008) (book review).
246. See supra notes 123–26, 130–35, 156–79, 138–47 and accompanying text (whaling, erga omnes
obligations, fishery conservation, global environment, and climate change); cf. supra notes 7–8 and ac-
companying text (nuclear non-proliferation).
247. See Extavour, supra note 113, at 157–59.
248. See David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 817, 817 (2002).
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tice. States sometimes use disobedient measures in lawmaking, without re-
percussion. This Article thus raises the question of how to manage the gap
between doctrine and practice.
Three basic strategies might be pursued. One is to try to bring the prac-
tice more in line with the doctrine. States that use disobedient measures
violate law and can be held responsible, even if only by other states respond-
ing with unfriendly unilateralism. This first strategy reflects a commitment
to legal rules as rules but not necessarily to the rule of law. Though disobe-
dient measures can destabilize interstate relations or undercut substantive
policy objectives, they also can have the opposite effect. They can help
deepen interstate cooperation, bolster international law, and achieve shared
policy goals. Applying the doctrine in all cases foregoes those potential rule-
of-law benefits.
A second strategy is to modify the doctrine informally, through state
practice over time. Recall, for example, that some scholars argue that an erga
omnes exception on third-state countermeasures has developed or is develop-
ing informally.249 A similar claim might be made for lawmaking. However,
effectively translating such a claim into formal doctrine would require de-
lineating, more precisely than is now possible, when measures that are cur-
rently disobedient should be lawful. Otherwise, the claim lacks discernable
limits and appears to invite conduct that, even if ultimately justifiable, is far
from ideal.
Perhaps the most appealing strategy, then, is to continue to tolerate the
gap between doctrine and practice. States would occasionally use or acqui-
esce in disobedient measures even as they continue to endorse the doctrine.
This strategy is preferable to the first because it allows states to seize on
unfriendly unilateralism’s lawmaking benefits. The practice reveals that
even disobedient measures can bring those benefits. This strategy is also
preferable to the second. It does not require delineating, in generally appli-
cable terms, when measures that are now disobedient should be lawful. In-
stead, the strategy allows disobedient measures to be appraised case-
specifically and puts on the acting state the onus of demonstrating that, in
the circumstances, disobedience does more good than harm.250 Finally, this
third strategy is appealing because it recognizes that the ideals that animate
the doctrine—about state cooperation and equality—should be endorsed
discursively, even when they are unfeasible in practice.251
249. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
250. Some scholars have argued for a similar arrangement in the context of unilateral humanitarian
interventions that involve armed force. See, e.g., Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal
Aspects, 10 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1, 22 (1999).
251. See generally Michael Reisman, Myth System and Operational Code, 3 Yale Stud. World Pub.
Ord. 229 (1977) (discussing gaps between myth systems and operational codes).
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C. Institutional Implications
The gap between doctrine and practice puts particular pressure on third-
party dispute resolution bodies. Recall that countermeasures are justified on
the ground that international law’s formal enforcement processes are often
deficient.252 This justification suggests that countermeasures are or should
be more suspect when third-party bodies can meaningfully supervise en-
forcement. Indeed, when the ILC was developing the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, it proposed requiring states to exhaust available third-party
options before resorting to countermeasures.253 The proposal was rejected
not as undesirable but as unrealistic.254 The ILC’s final commentary still
opines that, where both options are available, third-party bodies “should
substitute as far as possible for countermeasures.”255 Since then, third-party
bodies have continued to proliferate, and they now participate more rou-
tinely in international decisions.256 Some commentators thus contend that
the ILC was just “ahead of its time”—that states should or even must ex-
haust third-party options before resorting to countermeasures.257 By con-
trast, this Article questions the extent to which third-party dispute
resolution bodies should replace unfriendly unilateralism.
Most such bodies are suited for classically judicial functions, like applying
existing law, defining appropriate remedies, and participating in interstitial
lawmaking. Disputes that ask whether a state violated its obligations or
what remedy is due might be well suited for third-party resolution. For
these disputes, third-party resolution might be preferable to unfriendly uni-
lateralism.258 But third-party resolution is likely to be inapt when disputes
require fundamentally altering a legal relationship.259 The parties them-
252. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
253. See Rep. of the Int’l L. Comm’n, 44th Sess., May 4–July 24, 1992, ¶ 187, U.N. Doc. A/47/10,
GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 10  (1992).
254. See id. ¶ 160 (“[I]t was unrealistic to expect across-the-board acceptance of such a regime for the
whole of international law . . . .”).
255. Draft Articles, supra note 14, at 136.
256. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A
Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 899, 916 (2005) (describing significant increase in
judicial caseload); Andrea K. Schneider, Bargaining in the Shadow of (International) Law: What the Normali-
zation of Adjudication in International Governance Regimes Means for Dispute Resolution, 41 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L.
& Pol. 789, 789 (2009) (“The use of courts for a variety of international disputes has now been normal-
ized . . . .”); Shany, supra note 234, at 75 (“[T]he number of international courts and other international
law-applying institutions (such as arbitration institutions and quasi-judicial committees) has grown
exponentially.”).
257. Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Power and Purpose of International Law 259 (2008); see
also Noortmann, supra note 70, at 4 (describing “an increasing skepticism” of countermeasures).
258. Even in these cases, the third-party body must be accepted as the appropriate decision-maker or
embedded in a fairly robust regime for it to be effective. See, e.g., Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope,
Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 Am. J. Int’l L. 26, 47 (1997).
259. Many third-party mechanisms recognize their limits in these kinds of disputes. See, e.g., Final
EFTA Decision, supra note 83, at 3 (declining jurisdiction over question arising under a separate regime);
Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, ¶ 56, WT/DS308/AB/R
(Mar. 6, 2006) (“We see no basis . . . for [WTO bodies] to adjudicate non-WTO disputes.”);
Gabcı́kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶¶ 140–41 (Sept. 25) (“It is not for the
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selves must accept the new arrangement in order for it to function smoothly.
Relying too heavily on third-party bodies might lead to a less effective or
legitimate result than would using unfriendly unilateralism to instigate a
decentralized process for reform.260
Further, third-party bodies that confront unfriendly unilateralism will be
both expected and inclined to apply the formal doctrine on state responsibil-
ity. A third-party body that strays too far from the doctrine risks undermin-
ing its legitimacy and creating the impression that it acted ultra vires.261
But applying the doctrine risks inhibiting unfriendly unilateralism that,
though on the whole desirable, is disobedient. Here again, a third-party
body might best decide a case by avoiding the merits and kicking the sub-
stantive decision back to the parties.
VI. Conclusion
This Article has argued that unfriendly unilateralism not only enforces
but also helps generate international law. Further, its lawmaking functions
are vital to the international legal order. Lawmaking helps maintain the
legal order and keep the law relevant. Though lawmaking usually occurs
through formal processes or without unfriendly unilateralism, those alterna-
tives are sometimes stagnant or ineffective. Unfriendly unilateralism is a
potentially useful corrective.
Of course, unfriendly unilateralism is not an unalloyed good. The acting
state exploits its power and might even stray from its legal obligations,
without the structured oversight or input of other global actors. The con-
duct thus can be abused. An acting state might overwhelm the target’s sov-
ereign prerogatives or displace important legal interests. But that risk of
abuse has never warranted an absolute ban on unfriendly unilateralism—or
even on unfriendly unilateralism that is noncompliant. International law tol-
erates unfriendly unilateralism for enforcement because, here, the conduct is
understood to do more good than harm. Enforcement is not always more
valuable than lawmaking. And preserving the status quo is not always pref-
erable to instigating change.
Court . . . [but] for the Parties themselves to find an agreed solution that takes account of the objectives
of the Treaty. . . .”).
260. See Shany, supra note 234, at 88 (“Whereas diplomatic dispute settlement is flexible and may
generate imaginative solutions which are closely attuned to the cumulative interests of the parties to the
dispute . . . [a third-party’s ability] to fix bilateral relations, solve the roots of the problem at hand, and
generate compliance may be limited.”).
261. See Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in
International Law, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 302, 305 (1999).
